

THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE JOURNAL NUMBER TWENTY-FIVE

HUMAN PROBLEMS
IN
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

XXV

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HUMAN PROBLEMS
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BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

XXV

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Published on behalf of

THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE INSTITUTE

by the

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

1959

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Published on behalf of
THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE INSTITUTE

by the

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS
316-324, OXFORD ROAD, MANCHESTER, 13

and in the U.S.A. by

HUMANITIES PRESS INC.
303 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, 10

The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal

Human Problems in British Central Africa

Editorial Board

Dr. Elizabeth Colson, Professor Max Gluckman,
Professor J. Clyde Mitchell

Co-ordinating Editor : The Director of the Institute

This Journal, published half-yearly in March and September, aims to define simply, but with scientific accuracy, the social problems facing man in Central Africa, to record what is known of such problems and to report on research being undertaken and required in the future.

Contributions are not confined to research by the Institute's past and present staff : articles and notes are welcome from all those working in the field covered, or those engaged on similar problems elsewhere whose findings are applicable to the Central African field.

The standard length of articles is in the region of 10,000 words, but longer or shorter articles will be considered from time to time. Articles should be accompanied by summaries of 100-200 words.

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With the exception of No. 1, which is out of print, back numbers can be obtained from Manchester University Press as follows :

Nos. 2-4 at 2*s.* 6*d.* each

Nos. 5-10 at 4*s.* each

Nos. 11 onwards at 5*s.* each

Postage 3*d.* extra.

HUMAN PROBLEMS IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

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Contributors to this Issue

Dr. Cyril A. Rogers was born in New Zealand and studied at the Universities of Auckland, Melbourne and London. During 1952 and 1953 he was Senior Research Fellow in Psychology at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He has contributed numerous articles to various psychological and medical journals and recently published a book on 'Measuring Intelligence in New Zealand'. He is now on the staff of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and is directing a number of studies in the field of race relations.

Barry N. Floyd carried out the research on which his article is based in the most practical way of taking an administrative appointment connected with the implementation of the Act he describes and analyses. The results of his year's field study in Southern Rhodesia are being submitted for the Ph.D. degree of Syracuse University, New York State.

L. H. Gann, at present an archivist at the Central African Archives, Salisbury, is the author of *Birth of a Plural Society*, published on behalf of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in 1958 by Manchester University Press. He is at present engaged, in collaboration with Peter Duignan, on a Pelican book on Africa.

Dr. I. M. Lewis, Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, carried out field research among the Somali as Colonial Social Science Research Council Fellow, 1955-57. He is the author of *Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, Saho* (an Ethnographic Survey), 1955; *Modern Political Movements in Somaliland*, International African Institute memorandum xxx, 1958; and other articles on the Somali.

EDITORIAL NOTES

THIS number of the Journal is devoted mainly to Southern Rhodesia: it is hoped that the following issue, No. 26, will contain a preponderance of articles and notes dealing with subjects arising in Nyasaland.

The first article in this issue, by Dr. Rogers, is particularly welcome, as it is the first that we have published by a member of the staff of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland arising from researches conducted from the College and assisted by undergraduate members of the College. This article also covers a field which we have not dealt with before, the organization of political attitudes in Southern Rhodesia, but one which becomes increasingly important as all the communities of Central Africa step up their demands for a greater measure of control over their own affairs.

Economic development is however equally important both in the urban and rural setting, so it is appropriate to publish alongside work on political attitudes an account, and some criticism, of the workings of the Native Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Floyd entered this area of study by the very practical means of taking employment as a Land Development Officer, and in this capacity his postings gave him experience in numerous districts far distant from each other so presenting great variations in the physical and social environment. With assistance from the Nuffield Foundation and this Institute, Mr. Floyd was able to prolong his study in Central Africa to prepare the material we publish. This is the extended text of a paper read before the Social Science Research Committee of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: it was also considered in a Seminar at the Institute and provoked a lively discussion in which Agricultural Officers and practical farmers participated.

The remainder of the issue is made up of reviews and review articles by old and new contributors, which cover a wide range of subjects, and provoke and stimulate fresh lines of thought. Dr. Lewis's review article was read at the first anthropological field seminar held at the University College which is referred to elsewhere in this issue, and incorporates some comments which the subsequent discussion evoked.

THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

by

CYRIL A. ROGERS

Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, with the assistance of

PATRICIA DALY, N. D. R. ELKINGTON, DIANA M. REYNOLDS, N. SCHAFER
and PRUDENCE D. WHEELDON

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

ON 23rd October, 1953, sixty-four years after the granting of Rhodes's Charter in Central Africa, the Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland came into being. At the present time, in 1958, the population of the Federation is something over seven million people, including about a quarter of a million Europeans who have settled or been born in the country. Most of the Europeans reside in Southern Rhodesia, which has been a self-governing colony since 1923, a colony over which the United Kingdom Government has never exercised its right to veto the Parliamentary measures passed in Salisbury. Thus, by constitutional usage, the Southern Rhodesian portion of the Federation has in fact been accorded a status not far removed from the Dominion Status enjoyed by other independent nations of the Commonwealth.

The history of effective British occupation in Southern Rhodesia does not go back much further than 1890 when a Pioneer column, despatched from the South by Cecil Rhodes, moved laboriously up through the Matabele territory of the African King, Lobengula, and pitched camp on a spot in Mashonaland that was to become the modern city of Salisbury. As may be expected, Central Africa had been known to Europeans long before this. Walker (1957) furnishes evidence that the Portuguese, the Voortrekkers, missionaries—including Livingstone, traders, concession hunters, explorers and scallawags, had penetrated the area in the decades, and indeed centuries in the case of the Portuguese, before 1890. But this story does not concern us here.

Since responsible government was obtained for Southern Rhodesia in 1923, a number of political parties have emerged, each with its own viewpoint on the conduct of Native (now African) affairs. These parties have ranged through a political spectrum from those like the Confederate party (1958) which advocates a policy of apartheid on the model of the present Nationalist party in the Union of South Africa, to those like the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (1957), which support universal adult suffrage and

complete social integration.¹ Most parties have taken a stand somewhere between these two points, a stand determined in part by the attitude of the party towards African matters.

Now attitudes towards the African have been influenced from a number of directions including Britain and the Union—which have supplied most of Southern Rhodesia's immigrants—but it is not unlikely that the most important of the moulding influences have crossed the Limpopo from our powerful neighbour to the South. In a scholarly treatise, MacCrone (1937) shows the historical geneses of attitudes in South Africa and how these have been forged on the anvil of racial misunderstanding, clash and conflict. On the basis of evidence to hand but not yet published, it seems fairly clear that the Pioneer and later columns imported with them the attitudes towards Africans that had been moulded previously in the South. It is not unreasonable to hypothesise that these attitudes have influenced Southern Rhodesia's domestic policy towards the African.

But racial attitudes in any country always display considerable diversity and in Southern Rhodesia it is not difficult to find persons who hold very favourable attitudes towards the African as well as others who nurture very unfavourable attitudes. In the last territorial election in Southern Rhodesia (5th June, 1958) it was evident that the major political parties reflected differing attitudes towards the African, and it became the convention in the press and on the public platform to label some as left-wing and others as right-wing. Now the terms 'left' and 'right' as political labels need some definition. In Southern Rhodesia they have little or nothing to do with political direction as it is conceived in countries like Britain, Australia or New Zealand. Simply defined, during the election campaign, to be left-wing meant pro-African while right-wing implied either a more cautious attitude towards African advancement or to be opposed to it except on a basis of apartheid as it is viewed in the Union. Like many definitions, this one is an oversimplification, but it fits the political statements of the election reasonably well.

In terms of this left-right definition, the political parties would be ranged along a continuum in something like the order shown in Fig. 1.

African National Congress	Constit- ution Party	United Rhodesia Party	United Federal Party	Dominion Party	Con- federate Party
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


Fig. 1.—Attitudes about the African held by the S.R. parties

¹ A state of emergency was declared in Southern Rhodesia on the 26th February, 1959, and the African National Congress was proscribed throughout the territory.

In the early part of the election campaign, all six parties entered the lists, but by the closing day for nomination only three—the J.R.P., the U.F.P., and the D.P.—had decided to contest seats. However, to depict the continuum clearly, it is apposite to give a humbail sketch of each with some reference—albeit inadequate—to attitudes on African matters, particularly to attitudes towards the qualifications for the vote.

The African National Congress, led by Mr. J. Nkomo, advocated a universal adult franchise regardless of the property and educational qualifications insisted on by most of the other parties. However, as the number of Africans on the common voter's roll was small (about 1200 out of a total electorate of approximately 55,000) and would influence the result but little, the Congress decided to stand aside and watch from the side lines.

The Constitution Party following the Capricorn Africa principles of Colonel David Stirling, recommended the extension of voting rights to more Africans than can qualify under the present laws, and ultimately to all of adult age.

The United Rhodesia Party led by the former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. R. S. Garfield Todd, sponsored a programme of social and electoral advance for the African, with voting rights in the hands of all civilized adults irrespective of race. Because of disagreement with Mr. Todd's African policy, and possibly for other reasons, the last Southern Rhodesian Government became divided and Mr. Todd's Ministry fell.

The United Federal Party, under the leadership of Sir Edgar Whitehead, advocated a policy that was practically identical with that of the U.R.P., but it maintained generally that the followers of Mr. Todd were too left-wing in a traditionally middle-of-the-road country.

The Dominion Party, under the banner of Mr. R. Stockil, published a policy statement that also supported African advancement but which demanded considerably higher property and educational qualifications than those extant for the vote.

The Confederate Party stood for complete apartheid, political, educational and social, and for the restriction of the government to white people only and for all time. From the public platform, members of the Confederate Party insisted that all the other parties were left-wing, a damning epithet in Central Africa.

Such were the parties which entered the fray at the onset of the electoral campaign; they have been described in much more detail elsewhere by Richardson (1958). Because of the crucial political situation it was decided to test the notion that some parties were 'left' and others 'right' when compared with the structure of politics in the United Kingdom.

THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES

In a detailed study of the structure of political attitudes in Britain, Eysenck (1954) has demonstrated that the major political parties—the Communists, Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives and Fascists—reflect differing opinions on a variety of important social matters. Disraeli has said that ‘party is organized opinion’, and following this dictum, Eysenck has proceeded to analyse the attitudes cropping out from the major political parties.

Now, before the researches of Eysenck and others, it was postulated frequently that the political parties of Britain could be arranged along a single continuum ranging from the Communists on the left through the Socialists, Liberals and Conservatives in that order, to the Fascists on the right. Such a description resulted in logical contradictions which were resolved when Eysenck (1957) empirically determined that at least two dimensions were needed to give an adequate portrayal of the attitudes generally held by the different political parties. These dimensions were identified as toughminded-tenderminded and radical-conservative respectively and the positions of the political parties in relation to them are shown in Fig. 2.

Looking at the two dimensions for a moment rather than the parties we find that conservatives on the average share the view that nationalization is inefficient, that coloured people are inferior to white, that the death penalty should be maintained, that religious education should be compulsory and so on. On the other hand, radicals generally believe that nations should give up some of their sovereignty, that private property should be abolished, that Sunday observance is old-fashioned and so forth. Eysenck shows that the difference between these social attitudes represents a genuine radical-conservative continuum.

On turning to the toughminded-tenderminded dimension, consistent patterns emerge again. The toughminded groups openly display aggressive and sexual attitudes. The death penalty is favoured and so are corporal punishment, trial marriage, easier divorce laws, and the like. At the tenderminded end of the dimension, on the average, the attitudes expressed favour going back to religion, pacifism, the toleration of conscientious objectors, the abolition of flogging and other aggressive practices. These findings flow from detailed studies of thousands of British men and women, of differing occupational backgrounds, education and ages.

As one would expect, there is overlap and considerable variation between the individuals of any political party, yet when they are analysed as groups, consistent attitudes emerge. From Fig. 2 we see that communists are toughminded radicals while fascists are toughminded conservatives; liberals are tenderminded and occupy approximately a halfway position on the radical-conservative dimension; socialists and conservatives are both intermediate on the




FIG. 2.—Empirically determined positions of five major British political parties and the parties of Southern Rhodesia

toughminded-tenderminded dimension but to the left and right respectively on the radical-conservative continuum.

With this clear description of the positions of the British political parties available, it was decided to relate the three parties contesting the Southern Rhodesia election to the same dimensional system. After a study of the literature and after attending many political meetings held by the three parties, it was possible to educe a number of hypotheses that could be tested experimentally by means of Eysenck's (1957) well-calibrated measure of social attitudes.

Hypotheses

1. That all three Southern Rhodesia political parties—the U.R.P.,

- the U.F.P., and the D.P.—fall towards the conservative end of the radical-conservative dimension.
2. That on the toughminded-tenderminded dimension, the U.R.P. is the most tenderminded, and then the U.F.P., with the D.P. being the least tenderminded.
 3. That by analysing separately the items reflecting attitude on race the U.R.P. would display the most favourable attitudes towards the African, the U.F.P. next and the D.P. the least favourable attitudes about the African, thus supporting the continuum illustrated in Fig. 1.
 4. That there is a positive relation between attitudes about Africans and about Jews.
 5. That the D.P. would hold the most conservative attitudes towards crime and punishment, the U.F.P. next, and the U.R.P. the least conservative attitudes.
 6. That in their attitude towards the maintenance of internal order within the country, all three Rhodesian parties would tend to be toughminded rather than tenderminded.

Subjects

The subjects for the investigation were drawn from many centres in Southern Rhodesia, the largest number coming from Salisbury, the capital, with the second largest proportion from Bulawayo, and the rest from other much smaller townships and rural areas. All subjects were aged at least 21 years which is the minimum statutory age for voting, and all had resided in Southern Rhodesia for at least two years which is the minimum period required for British subjects to become Rhodesian citizens. This minimum period of two years was probably of value for another reason too. It is frequently argued that the political and racial attitudes of new Rhodesians undergo their most profound modification within the first two years of arriving in the country; hence, by restricting the investigation to qualified voters, it was hoped to tap a more stabilized pattern of beliefs.

In all, 256 voters were tested, 87 giving the U.R.P. as their voting reaction, 93 the U.F.P. and 76 the D.P. In the item analyses these numbers occasionally dropped a little because an item may have been scored equivocally or omitted.

As part of the survey, information in addition to voting reaction was obtained. On the head of education, persons who voted U.R.P. had spent an average of 12·7 years at their schooling, those voting U.F.P. an average of 11·7, and those voting D.P. an average of 10·0 years. The average length of time lived in Africa south of the Sahara was 20·5 years for the U.R.P., 23·0 years for the U.F.P., and 24·2 years for the D.P.

The birthplace of each voter was obtained to enable us to compare our sampling with the percentages of Europeans aged 20 and above as at the last census (1957) in Southern Rhodesia. This was done

on the assumption that a person aged 20 at the time of the census could have obtained a vote the following year provided he possessed the necessary residential and nationality qualifications. The population figures were kindly furnished by the Central African Statistical Office, and Table I makes the comparison.

<i>Country of birth</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Sample %</i>
Commonwealth		
Central Africa Federation . .	15.6	27.0
Union of South Africa . . .	35.2	35.5
U.K., Eire, Channel Is. & Malta	35.6	33.6
Other Commonwealth Nations .	3.4	3.5
Foreign Countries	9.2	.4
Visitors, Born at Sea and not stated	1.0	0
	100.0	100.0

TABLE 1: Distribution of European population by country of birth

There are some discrepancies which can be noted. In the sample we have a considerably higher proportion born within Rhodesia and Nyasaland than the proportion found by the Statistical Office, thus giving our study a bias towards the attitudes held by people who have lived longest in the territory. It is arguable that this is to the good. The next biggest difference is between the foreign born who are citizens and who voted, and the percentage of foreign born who live within the territory but did not vote, either because they are not citizens or are not on the electoral role.

Some attempt was also made to match the occupational background of our sample with that of the population. On this count the sample fell short of adequate. For agriculture, mining, building and government, the sample matches the population well. The sample is light on individuals in manufacturing, transport and the wholesale-retail trade, while it is overweighted on the side of finance, and the professions. Even so, from the stability of the assessments which we obtained for each political party, it is hardly likely that a more precise sampling of occupations would significantly effect the testing of the hypotheses.

Procedures

Eysenck's measure of social attitudes was modified slightly and used to furnish the basic data. It was produced as a step-down test with all the scoring and information required being recorded on a specially designed answer sheet. Five graduate students were employed in the field to administer the tests during and immediately

after the Southern Rhodesia election of 5th June, 1958. There seemed to be some merit in collecting the data after the election to avoid the vagaries associated with last minute changes in intended voting reaction. Consequently, nearly all the tests were administered shortly after the election. Of those tested before the election, as many as could be reached were questioned afterwards to see if they had voted differently from the way indicated to the field workers. No changes were discovered although this does not guarantee that they did not take place.

When the data had been gathered they were analysed to test each of the hypotheses erected at the beginning of the study. In addition certain items on the scale which probe racial and ethnocentric attitudes have been analysed separately. The results of these analyses are presented below and an attempt is made to imbricate them into a tentative theory of learning.

Results

(1) The first hypothesis tested was that all three Southern Rhodesia political parties fell towards the conservative end of the radical-conservative dimension. The means on this dimension—and the standard deviations for each party—are shown in Table 2.

Explanation of columns in Table 2.

- (1) The political parties contesting the territorial elections in Southern Rhodesia.
- (2) Number of cases in the sample.
- (3) The mean score obtained by each party on the radical-conservative (R) dimension.
- (4) The standard deviation of the scores obtained by each party on the R dimension.
- (5) The difference between each party on the R dimension; e.g., the U.R.P. minus the U.F.P.
- (6) The numerical difference between each party on the R dimension.
- (7) Gosset's t value based on the difference between the mean scores.
- (8) The level of confidence that can be placed on the inference that the obtained difference would have arisen by chance; i.e., the chances are considerably less than one in one thousand.
- (9) The null hypothesis that the difference could have arisen by chance; i.e., it is rejected.

Table 2 might be read in conjunction with Fig. 2. It will be seen that the scores which are larger than 7.5 lie to the radical end of the dimension and scores that fall below this point are on the conservative end. This being so, all three parties, the U.R.P., and the U.F.P., and then the D.P., may be classified as conservative, which supports our original hypothesis. The D.P. is the most conservative of the parties, the U.F.P. less so, the U.R.P., while still being conservative,

<i>Party</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>l. of c.</i>	<i>Null Hypotheses</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
URP	87	6.57	2.81	URP-UFP	1.62	4.16	<0.1%	Rejected
UFP	93	4.95	2.41	URP-DP	2.68	6.67	<0.1%	Rejected
DP	76	3.89	2.18	UFP-DP	1.06	2.91	<1.0%	Rejected
Total	256							

TABLE 2: Mean scores of the Rhodesian political parties on the radical-conservative (R) dimension and the significance of the differences between these means

falls closest to the point of origin on the scale. Thus the charge made during the election that the U.R.P. was a party of the 'left' (see Richardson, 1958) cannot be supported on our findings. Indeed, when compared with the structure of British politics on the radical-conservative dimension, the U.R.P. is significantly closer to the 'middle-of-the-road' than either of the other two parties.

The differences between the mean positions of the parties were next tested by means of Gosset's *t* test, and the null hypotheses that the differences could be accounted for on the grounds of chance were rejected at high levels of confidence. As might be expected, the difference between the U.R.P. and the D.P. on the radical-conservative dimension is greatest, and the null hypothesis can be rejected at well over the 0.1 per cent level of confidence. Next in size is the difference between the U.R.P. and the U.F.P., with the difference between the U.F.P. and the D.P. smallest in magnitude. But even if an austere 1 per cent level of confidence is adopted for the rejection of the null hypothesis, the difference between the U.F.P. and the D.P. is still statistically significant.

An inspection of the standard deviation shows that the D.P. is the most consistent in its attitude towards the radical-conservative items of the scale, the U.F.P. somewhat less consistent and the U.R.P. shows the greatest heterogeneity. Also, on our figures, considerable overlap between the parties is evident; Fig. 2 shows the positions of the Rhodesian parties along with their distributions one sigma on either side of the mean. The empirical deduction is that the U.F.P. contains many individuals who really fall within the orbit of the U.R.P., but did not vote for it, and many who fall naturally into the D.P. sphere. Similar deductions can be made for the other two parties, although there is least overlap between the U.R.P. and the D.P. This is as one might expect.

(2a) The second hypothesis tested was that on the toughminded-tenderminded dimension, the U.R.P. is the most tenderminded, then

the U.F.P. with the D.P. being the least tenderminded. Table 3 summarizes the statistical evidence about these hypotheses.

<i>Party</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>l. of c.</i>	<i>Null Hypotheses</i>
URP	87	17.51	5.62	URP-UFP	1.35	1.77	> 5.0%	Supported
UFP	93	16.16	4.56	URP-DP	3.56	4.15	< 0.1%	Rejected
DP	76	13.95	5.22	UFP-DP	2.21	2.92	< 1.0%	Rejected
Total	256	15.31						

TABLE 3: Mean scores of the Rhodesian parties on the toughminded-tenderminded (T) dimension and the significance of the differences between these means

From Table 3 and Fig. 2 it is clear that the hypothesis is supported. The D.P. falls almost at the point of origin on the dimension, and the central position of the party is neither toughminded nor tenderminded. In fact, its position corresponds very closely to that of the Conservative Party in Great Britain. Although, as the standard deviation of 5.22 shows, there are persons within the D.P. who take a very toughminded stand, the centre of gravity of the party can hardly be equated with the 'uncharitably tough' factor described in MacCrone's (1955) work on ethnocentrism.

The U.F.P. falls more to the tenderminded end of the dimension, and the difference between it and the D.P. can be accepted as statistically significant at the one per cent level of confidence. The U.R.P. is the most tenderminded of the parties although its difference from the U.F.P. cannot be supported statistically at an austere level. As might be expected, the difference between the U.R.P. and the D.P. is highly significant. It is worth noting (Fig. 2) that the U.R.P. occupies a position on our two dimensional scale that corresponds almost exactly with that of the British Liberal Party. Such a position is tenderminded and slightly conservative. Thus the statement made frequently during the election campaign, that the U.R.P. was a liberal party, is certainly sustained.

The standard deviations on the toughminded-tenderminded dimension are worthy of scrutiny, particularly as MacCrone (1955) points to a relation between this dimension and attitude towards the African. From a study of our material, it seems likely that before the crisis over Mr. Todd's African Policy, the U.F.P. was the most heterogeneous of the three major political parties, and in a sense was 'all things to all men'. Naturally, our evidence on this point is indirect as the study was done after the crisis. We do know, however, that after the U.F.P. party caucus of 23rd April when Mr. Todd

and six followers resigned to resuscitate the old U.R.P., a considerable number of people also left the party, some following Mr. Todd to the U.R.P. and others swinging to the D.P. The reasons for these changes in party allegiance may be many, but it is not unreasonable to postulate that the party crisis was an influencing factor in many instances. Anyway, our figures show that the U.F.P., on the tough-minded-tenderminded dimension, is now the most homogeneous, with the U.R.P. displaying the greatest amount of heterogeneity in attitude among its members. The implication is that the 11·8 per cent of the electorate who voted for the U.R.P., did so for a greater range of reasons than those characterizing the other parties. This is particularly significant when it is appreciated that the U.F.P. and the D.P., with their much larger numbers of supporters, ought, in theory, to have displayed greater diversity than the U.R.P. The reasons for the larger dispersion within the U.R.P. have not been examined in this study.

(2b) A finding which can be educed as a corollary, from the foregoing hypotheses, concerns the centre of gravity of the whole community on the T and R scales. Weighted means were employed to determine that the three parties, with a combined T score of 15·3, fell just slightly on the tenderminded side of the dimension. The R score of 4·66 was very much on the conservative side of the radical-conservative dimension. These two scores are co-ordinated on Fig. 2 which shows clearly that the Rhodesian political parties centre on a position that is very close to that occupied by the British Conservative party.

(3a) The next task was to see whether or not the three parties could be placed on a continuum on which members of the U.R.P. displayed the most favourable attitudes towards the African, members of the D.P. the least favourable attitudes, with the U.F.P. somewhere in between. To effect this, the four items reflecting attitude on race, were analysed by party. They were:

2. Coloured people are innately inferior to white people.
15. It would be a mistake to have coloured people as foremen over whites.
44. All forms of discrimination against the coloured races, the Jews, etc., should be made illegal, and subject to heavy penalties.
54. It would be best to keep coloured people in their own districts and schools, in order to prevent too much contact with whites.

Item No. 2 expresses an attitude that is not uncommon in Southern Rhodesia. Item No. 15 would receive support at many socio-economic levels within the community, but more particularly within the artisan and semi-artisan classes who experience more keenly the competition that is resulting from the emergent African. Legislation against racial discrimination (item 44) has been debated for years, within the government, in the press and on the political platform, but little positive action has been taken. The sentiment expressed

in item 54 receives legal sanction in Southern Rhodesia because, under the Land Apportionment Act, Africans and Europeans must live in separate areas and attend separate schools.

These items would seem particularly valuable in examining the attitude of the different political parties towards the African, even though it is realized the reliability achieved through 4 items may be less than is statistically desirable. Even so, significant differences would not emerge if the items possessed no reliability or validity, and inasmuch as they do emerge, we are on secure ground. To score the items, Likert's (1932) arbitrary method of assigning values of one through five to the various responses was adopted; this method has been shown to correlate with the much more involved sigma method of scoring, to the extent of 0.99.

<i>Party</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>l. of c.</i>	<i>Null Hypothesis</i>
URP	8.92	3.20	URP-UFP	3.45	7.38	175	<0.1%	Rejected
UFP	12.37	2.99	URP-DP	5.69	10.90	158	<0.1%	Rejected
DP	14.61	3.37	UFP-DP	2.25	4.53	165	<0.1%	Rejected

TABLE 4: Attitude of the Rhodesian political parties about non-Europeans

Table 4 and Fig. 3 show our analyses clearly. The four items employed are designed to measure attitudes about non-Europeans in general rather than Africans, but it has been assumed that the dominant reference throughout has been to Africans. The positions of the parties are quite clear and the differences between them are significant at extremely high levels of confidence. The U.R.P. is shown clearly to have the most favourable attitudes about the African, the attitudes within the D.P. centre around an unfavourable position, while the U.F.P. occupies a position that is almost exactly on the point of origin which separates the favourable from the unfavourable attitudes. The difference between the U.F.P. and the D.P., while being significant at above the 0.1 per cent level of confidence, is not as extensive as the difference between the U.R.P. and the U.F.P. Our evidence supports the continuum illustrated in Fig. 1.

The standard deviations show that there is a substantial overlap between the parties in their attitudes towards non-Europeans, so that towards the ends of the distributions there are members of the D.P. with attitudes that are as favourable as those occupying the central position of the U.R.P. The U.F.P. overlaps considerably with both the U.R.P. and the D.P. Our figures again support the thesis that the U.F.P. is more homogeneous in its attitudes towards the African than either of the other two parties. However, on the four selected

items, the D.P. displays greater variability than the U.R.P. which is contrary to the finding in Section 2.

(3b) By weighting the means of each party, the sample reflects the attitude (12.99) of the community towards the African; it is on the unfavourable side of the pro-con dimension. From other evidence (not yet published) this finding gets considerable support.




FIG. 3.—Positions of the Rhodesian political parties on the African and Jewish dimensions

(4) The next hypothesis stated that there is a positive relation between attitudes about Africans and about Jews, and if this is so, there should be some differentiation between the political parties. Three items were employed as a block to test this hypothesis.

19. There may be a few exceptions, but in general, Jews are pretty much alike.

44. All forms of discrimination against coloured races, the Jews, etc., should be made illegal, and subject to heavy penalties.

46. Jews are as valuable citizens as any other group.

Likert scoring was employed for the items and the same strictures made in Section 3 must also be made here on the reliability of small numbers of items. Also, item 44 overlaps with attitude about non-Europeans. But even when these limitations are given full weight, it still appears worthwhile to cite the differences that emerge. These are reported in Table 5 and displayed graphically in Fig. 3.

Party	M.	S.D.	Parties	Diff.	t	d.f.	l. of c.	Null Hypothesis
URP	6.49	2.18	URP-UFP	1.09	3.21	175	<1.0%	Rejected
UFP	7.58	1.78	URP-DP	2.48	7.29	158	<0.1%	Rejected
DP	8.97	2.08	UFP-DP	1.39	4.64	165	<0.1%	Rejected

TABLE 5: Attitude of the Rhodesian political parties about Jews

The figures speak for themselves. The U.R.P. falls towards the pro-Jewish end of the continuum, the U.F.P., although favourable in its attitude towards Jews, is significantly less so than the U.R.P., while the mean position of the D.P. falls at a point which corresponds almost exactly with the dividing line between favourable and unfavourable attitudes. When the standard deviations are scrutinized, it is evident that the D.P. contains the greatest number of individuals who hold unfavourable attitudes about Jews, as well as the greatest number who hold unfavourable attitudes about Africans. This empirical finding, plus the linear relation displayed in Fig. 3, suggested a positive correlation between attitude about Africans and about Jews.

The attitudes about Africans and Jews, as measured on our selected items, correlated to the extent of

$$r_{xy} = 0.60.$$

This finding is of particular interest inasmuch as it agrees with the hypothesis put forward by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik and others (1950) that attitudes towards out-groups of people correlate positively in the form of an ethnocentric ideology. They find that there is some generality to outgroup rejection. The ingroup-outgroup distinction becomes the basis of much of the ethnocentric indi-

vidual's 'social thinking'; people belonging to outgroups are evaluated according to the stereotypes which are held about those outgroups. The major difference between the various outgroups of American society and those of Central Africa is that in America all the outgroups (Jews, Negroes, political radicals, etc.) are minority groups, whereas in Southern Rhodesia the African outgroup greatly outnumbers the dominant European ingroup. But the pattern seems similar in California and Central Africa, namely that while an ethnocentric individual may have a particular dislike for one group of people, he is likely none the less to have ethnocentric attitudes regarding many other groups. This was MacCrone's (1937) finding too when he applied a Bogardus type of social distance questionnaire to considerable numbers of South African students. In our study, the relation between attitudes about Jews and Africans may be ascribed to a more fundamental ideology of ethnocentrism, although it is not our intention to explore the matter further here.

Frenkel-Brunswik (1948, 1950) has adduced considerable evidence to support her postulate that these ethnocentric attitudes are related to the child rearing practices of parents. Toughminded parents adopt certain authoritarian child rearing practices, and these seem to be connected to the attitudes developed by their children. However, there is no evidence to show whether or not this connection applies in Central Africa.

- (5) The hypothesis that the D.P. would hold the most conservative attitudes towards crime and punishment and the U.R.P. the least conservative, is an extension of the hypothesis that the parties can be differentiated on a conservative-radical continuum. Four items were employed for the test.
- (10) Crimes of violence should be punished by flogging.
- (18) The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished.
- (29) Sex crimes such as rape and attacks on children deserve more than mere imprisonment, such criminals ought to be flogged or worse.
- (47) Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure them, not punish them.

Items 10 and 29 refer to crimes that can be punished by flogging. There are a considerable number of crimes in Southern Rhodesia which bear this penalty. Just to take a few examples, in the Magistrate's Court, and at the first conviction, flogging can be imposed for assault of either an aggravated or indecent nature, for *crimen injuria*, malicious injury to property, arson, culpable homicide, robbery, bestiality, an act of gross indecency between males, rape, or any other prescribed statutory offence. Under the law it is possible to impose the penalty of flogging for stealing a mealie (corn) cob, part of the staple diet of Africans. And the feeling is not uncommon that this form of punishment is one that the African 'understands' and must be employed. The idea of toughminded punishment, then, is one that finds common expression through the legal system of Southern

Rhodesia, much more common than is the case in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand for instance. The death penalty in Southern Rhodesia is reserved for murder, treason and rape.

Likert scoring was adopted for the items, with the scores above 12 falling towards the radical end of the dimension and the scores below 12 towards the conservative end. Eysenck (1954) has demonstrated that radical attitudes in Britain are commensurate with the abolition of flogging and the death sentence as penalties, whereas conservative attitudes are not. Our findings are shown in Table 6.

<i>Party</i>	<i>M.</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>l. of c.</i>	<i>Null Hypothesis</i>
URP	12.17	4.24	URP-UFP	1.98	3.30	176	<1.0%	Rejected
UFP	10.19	3.69	URP-DP	3.58	6.10	161	<0.1%	Rejected
DP	8.59	2.97	UFP-DP	1.60	3.11	165	<1.0%	Rejected

TABLE 6: Attitude of the Rhodesian political parties towards crime and punishment

The political parties in Southern Rhodesia, on their attitude towards crime and punishment, range, according to our items, from a position that is almost exactly mid-point (U.R.P.) on the radical-conservative dimension through to the quite conservative position of the D.P. The U.F.P. stands midway between two parties, that is, it occupies a moderately conservative position. The differences between the parties are all significant, although as is to be expected, the difference between the U.R.P. and the D.P. is the greatest.

The standard deviations reveal the usual overlap between the parties, although the D.P. is the most homogeneous in its attitude and the U.R.P. the most variable. Some members of the U.R.P. held conservative attitudes on punishment that coincide with those held in the D.P., although these are counter-balanced by views in favour of the abolition of flogging and capital punishment. The inference that can be drawn from our findings is that the D.P. would be the least likely to modify the laws on punishment, which are in fact both conservative and toughminded, while the U.R.P. would be more likely to modify them in the direction of legal practice in other Commonwealth countries such as Britain or New Zealand.

(6) The hypothesis that on the maintenance of internal order within the country, the Rhodesian parties would all tend to be toughminded, was included because of its particular reference to conditions extant in Central Africa. Nothing much should be attached to the findings because so little is known of the reliability and validity of single items. Our findings have been included for their interest and in the hope that they will be tested empirically in the future.

The item employed was

58. The maintenance of internal order within the nation is more important than ensuring that there is complete freedom for all. It would seem that this matter is of concern to the majority of white Rhodesians. Aware as they are of the vast preponderance of the African population, keenly sensitive to the reaction against the settlers of Kenya, and not uninfluenced by the social attitudes from over the Limpopo, the Europeans in Rhodesia seem more concerned about security than is normally the case in other Anglo-Saxon communities. Even Mr. Todd's more tenderminded party, before his Ministry fell, had occasion to employ toughminded tactics to break an African strike.

Our findings are summarized in Table 7.

<i>Party</i>	<i>M.</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Parties</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>l. of c.</i>	<i>Null Hypothesis</i>
URP	2.76	.79	URP-UFP	.22	1.52	176	<10%	Supported
UFP	2.54	1.04	URP DP	.44	3.10	159	<1.0%	Rejected
DP	2.32	.98	UFP-DP	.22	1.44	165	<10%	Supported

TABLE 7: Attitude of the Rhodesian political parties towards internal security and freedom

It will be noted that the only significant difference is that between the U.R.P. and the D.P. More important, however, is the fact that on a Likert scale of from one to five, all three parties fall on the toughminded side of three, the median point to the scale. And this despite the fact that both the U.F.P. and the U.R.P. on the average are tenderminded parties. If these findings were verified (there is no empirical evidence either way) it would mean that all three parties in Rhodesia would be prepared to sacrifice some of the traditional democratic liberties on the assumption that the step would assist in the maintenance of internal order.¹ Such a step, of course, would not be unique to Southern Rhodesia; it is likely that other communities would act similarly.

ATTITUDES AND LEARNING THEORY

One of the necessary conditions of a scientific methodology is the use of the complementary processes of induction and hypothetic deduction. The condition is typical of the social as well as the physical sciences. Both try to describe facts and to deduce general laws or consistencies which in themselves may lead to the discovery

¹ Written six months before the emergency declared on the 26th February, 1959.

of further facts, and both test their general laws by the observation and measurement of the consequences which flow from them.

In this study an attempt has been made to analyse some of the attitudes which underly the political and racial behaviour of persons living in Southern Rhodesia. The first step consisted in the collection of data. Then in the light of what is already known about the structure of attitudes in Britain and elsewhere, hypotheses were formulated which would be formally tested and supported or disproved.

It seemed essential to us that these analyses be made because of the peculiar nature of Rhodesian society with its small, dominant group of Europeans and its large outgroup of Africans. As may be expected, this first study leaves unanswered most of the crucial questions that are raised about the relations between these two groups of people. But the facts which did emerge are supported at a high level of confidence.

All three political parties—the U.R.P., the U.F.P., and the D.P.—fall towards the conservative end of the radical-conservative continuum on the two-dimension system we have adopted. The D.P. falls very close to the position of the Conservative party in Britain and the U.R.P. to the Liberal party, but none take the stand of the Socialist party in its advocacy of profound social change. All emphasize, to varying degrees, the greater need of internal security rather than the extension of individual freedom. None of the parties takes a radical stand in favour of the abolition of flogging and capital punishment, although the U.R.P. would be more likely to modify the laws on punishment than the D.P. which takes both a conservative and toughminded attitude on the matter.

The parties vary considerably on the toughminded-tenderminded dimension, with the most tenderminded party—the U.R.P.—having the most favourable attitude towards Africans and Jews, and the D.P. the least favourable. In all our analyses the U.F.P. falls somewhere between the U.R.P. and the D.P. The correlation of 0.60 between attitudes about Africans and Jews, supports Hartley's (1946) demonstration that ethnocentric behaviour towards one outgroup is related to ethnocentric behaviour towards other outgroups. Thus, within Southern Rhodesia, we would expect to find that persons who are anti-African, would also tend to be anti-Jewish, anti-coloured, anti-Indian, and so on. There is so much evidence from elsewhere in favour of this ethnocentric complex that it is difficult to see how it could differ markedly in Southern Rhodesia.

It has been suggested at the outset that the social attitudes of Southern Rhodesia are influenced by attitudes in the south. But this hardly explains their genesis. Eysenck (1954) contends that attitudes are learned just as habits are learned. Habits, as defined by Hull (1943), and attitudes share the following characteristics: '(1) Attitudes and habits are both *learned* receptor-effector connections. (2) Attitudes and habits are both *dispositions* to act which cannot be

observed directly. (3) Attitudes and habits are *hypothetical constructs* requiring linking up with antecedent conditions and consequent behaviour for their measurement. (4) Attitudes and habits denote persisting states of the organism, resulting from reinforcement, which are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the evocation of any particular type of action under investigation.' Thus, in this novel formulation, ${}_sE_r = {}_sH_r \times D$ in which ${}_sE_r$ equals reaction potential, or the product of habit strength (${}_sH_r$) and primary drive (D). An attitude is a learned piece of behaviour but the learning itself does not produce action, either verbal or non-verbal. To the learning must be added D, the drive or motivation.

Within Eysenck's general scheme, we can see that attitudes are structured by two kinds of neural modifications, namely, learning and conditioning. Learning which is seen as the modification of behaviour through punishments and rewards (hedonism) appears to account for attitudes differentiated on the radical-conservative continuum; while conditioning by contiguity appears to account for the geneses of attitudes on the toughminded-tenderminded dimension. In later work it is hoped to examine the nature of attitudes in terms of learning theory on the assumption that this may lead to the discovery of hitherto unknown facts.

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CHANGING PATTERNS OF AFRICAN LAND USE IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

by

BARRY N. FLOYD

THIS paper is a preliminary report upon thirteen months of field work, from September 1957 to September 1958, undertaken while I was employed by the Native Department of Southern Rhodesia as a temporary Land Development Officer.

In the course of official duties, I was able to gain a working knowledge of the Native Land Husbandry Act and of the problems accompanying its implementation in the native reserves. This piece of legislation has been designed to bring about a profound change in the condition and organization of African farming in Southern Rhodesia; such an ambitious reform programme has inevitably received both praise and criticism from many sides. I propose to make a geographic evaluation now. The completed study is to be submitted as a doctoral dissertation in geography to Syracuse University, New York State, U.S.A.

This paper is divided into five sections. First, it has been thought wise, since a geographer is a *rara avis* in Southern Africa, to define, in as succinct a way as possible, the objectives of modern geographic study.

The second section contains a statement of my aims in undertaking this study, that is, a statement of the conceptual framework within which any geographic analysis of the Land Husbandry Act. (L.H.A.) should fit.

Third, it is necessary to sketch a picture, however inadequate, of the conditions which prevailed in the reserves prior to the passing of the L.H.A. From an historic point of view, we need to consider some of the facts, whether agricultural, economic, social, or political, which lay behind the adoption of such an ambitious and far-reaching attempt to reform African agriculture.

The fourth section deals with the Native Land Husbandry Act itself, reviews its stated objectives and describes the successive stages in the implementation of the Act.

Fifth, and perhaps most important, is an attempt to evaluate the significance of the Act, both from the agricultural—or technical—viewpoint and also from the human—or socio-economic—viewpoint. The probable consequences of certain features of the Act can be assessed, using geographic procedures. In this evaluation, I shall compare the work in Southern Rhodesia with rural develop-

ment schemes which are being undertaken, or which have been undertaken, in other parts of Africa.

The Objectives of Modern Geographic Study

Someone once said that there are as many definitions of geography as there are geographers. This would certainly point to a breadth of interest among those trained in geography, but it is this very diversity which forms the basis of criticisms about geographers from scholars in other fields.

The argument goes that the subject is 'neither fish nor fowl'. On the one hand, geography embraces physical studies such as geology, geomorphology, climatology, plant ecology and pedology, while on the human or cultural side, geographers are concerned with the facts of anthropology, sociology, history, political science and economics. They are also trained in the art or science of cartography, and air-photo interpretation, both highly useful aids to geographic research.

A geographer, it is thus claimed, is a 'Jack of all trades but master (or doctor) of none'. Such criticisms do, at times, have a certain validity. On the other hand, geographers will claim that there is a vital academic need today for an integrating or synthesizing science which will attempt to relate the physical and human facts of areas together, not in a deterministic, 'cause and effect' manner, but rather in a systematic treatment of the facts of place, a scientific concern for the association of things that give character to particular places on the earth's surface. Geography is, then, that field of learning in which the physical and cultural characteristics of different areas are examined; and it is that field which seeks to determine the significance of areal differences, in terms of causes and consequences. What should be emphasized is that it is a field which cannot be defined on the basis of subject matter, for anything that is distributed over the surface of the earth can be examined by geographical methods. Rather is geography a system of procedures, a distinctive approach.¹

The Aims of the Study

Turning to the objectives of my research, I shall describe and evaluate the changes in land use which are resulting from implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act. I am concerned with recording and analysing the geographic patterns of such things as land forms, precipitation, soil groups, mechanical conservation works, arable and grazing areas, crops, village settlements, population distributions, male absenteeism and so on. Indeed, the total visible and invisible imprint of the rural African upon those areas allotted to him for settlement is to come within the realm of this study. The contemporary and projected patterns so recorded will be

¹ Preston James & Clarence Jones (eds.), *American Geography: Inventory & Prospect* (Syracuse, 1954), p. 4.

contrasted with those from earlier periods in the African 'sequence of occupance' in the reserve areas.

In sum, I aim, as a geographer, to unravel the causes and pursue the consequences of the Land Husbandry Programme in the African areas of Southern Rhodesia, and will seek to establish whether a harmonious, economically viable relationship between man and land, hence man and society, will result from execution of the Act.¹

The matter of scale is of paramount importance to this study. I would have liked to cover the changes in native land use as they are occurring throughout Southern Rhodesia, but such a broad survey of some 50,000 square miles would be superficial and highly generalized in itself. So I have fallen back on intensive studies of selected small areas representative of larger areas and ultimately of the whole country. Obviously, these regional investigations must be based upon the work undertaken in the Mashonaland Native Districts where I was stationed as an L.D.O., and upon observations from other districts which were visited officially in the course of the year. Such micro-studies, on a topographic scale, should serve to illustrate the specific forms and patterns being fashioned by the African in his settlement of the land in selected areas. Quantitative as well as qualitative criteria should ensure as accurate a picture as possible of agricultural land occupance. On the basis then of these detailed surveys, the values and limitations of the Land Husbandry Programme to the country as a whole, and its repercussions beyond the agricultural sphere, should be capable of scholarly examination.

Historical Background

The account of conditions and events which preceded adoption of the L.H.A. must, of necessity, be dealt with only in skeleton form in this paper although it will comprise an important chapter in the dissertation itself.

One must assume a familiarity with the basic division of lands between European and African as developed over the last 60 years and legalized by the latest Land Apportionment Act (as amended). This territorial segregation is the essential framework within which any plan for native agrarian development must operate under the present political conditions in the Colony.

Also fundamental to the issue at hand is a consideration of the basic facts of earth and man, i.e. an account of the physical environment in those areas set aside as African reserves, and of the peoples living both in the reserves and away in urban areas. Deterioration of the physical resource base in the reserves is a direct consequence of unbalance in the man/land relationship. The African areas have grown no larger but the native population has increased rapidly since

¹ In this respect, a geographer's knowledge, like that of an anthropologist, can perhaps best be utilized not in prescribing policies, but in calling attention to the possible unforeseen implications of policies which have already been adopted.

the Occupation, from under $\frac{1}{2}$ million to over $2\frac{1}{4}$ millions, to the point where it can now double itself in the space of 23 years.¹ The earlier man/land ratios have been drastically upset. Herein lie the tap-roots to the agricultural and social problems of the reserves, and the reasons for their intensification over recent years.

An appreciation of the human elements of place is equally as important as the facts of topography, native vegetation, weather and soils. The attitudes, objectives and technical abilities of the African govern his exploitation of the physical environment. An understanding of the traditional social structures of tribes, and the inevitable modifications of these structures as a result of acculturation, or transculturation,² assists in evaluating earth/man relationships in the reserves. Native attitudes towards land and cattle,³ the tribal systems of land tenure, bridewealth, the economic responsibilities implicit in the 'web of kinship'—all these are grist for the geographer's mill in so far as they relate to the physical environment within which the drama of native life is played out.

The agricultural techniques practised by Africans in former years, particularly the ubiquitous tradition of shifting tillage or land rotation, go far towards illuminating the land use problems which were faced by the first Director of Native Agriculture in 1926 and which, despite outstanding efforts over 30 years, were never really solved.⁴

Summing up the problems prior to enactment of the L.H.A., the enormous increase in native population and livestock increased pressure on the available soil to such a degree that the natural resources were imperilled. Increased numbers of farmers, and the fact that, in places, as many as 90 per cent of them were part-time farmers, brought about uneconomic fragmentation of arable land. This system whereby the African divided his time between reserve and European areas led to a number of economic and social problems which could no longer be ignored.

These and other considerations concerning the physical and human aspects of reserve life lay behind the drafting of the Native Reserve Land Utilization and Good Husbandry Bill, and the radical changes which it proposed for the African peasant farmer.

The Native Land Husbandry Act

The Bill became law in 1951, and its accelerated implementation was undertaken by a Five Year Plan which was launched in 1956.

¹ S. Rhodesia, *Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the Year 1957* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 5.

² The term is Malinowski's. See B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change: an inquiry into race relations in Africa* (New Haven, 1945).

³ A Nigerian chief once said, 'I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless members are still unborn.' Quoted by C. K. Meek, *Land, Law and Custom in the Colonies* (London, 1949).

⁴ A satisfactory system, given the land and assuming primitive methods of cultivation, shifting tillage was quite unable to cope with the food requirements of a rapidly growing African population.

The preamble to the Act itself, in terse legal terms, states that its objective is 'to provide for the control of the utilization and allocation of land occupied by natives and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; (and) to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry. . . .' In these few uninspiring words, an agricultural and social reform has been initiated which, when completed, will affect intimately the lives of most of the indigenous Africans of Southern Rhodesia.

The Act has five important parts. The first deals with regulations for enforcing good farming practices such as the construction of contour terraces, crop rotation and the manuring and fertilizing of soils. The second covers the granting of grazing rights for livestock, and details those who are eligible to receive grazing permits. The third deals with the granting of farming rights. It defines the standard areas to be granted to farmers and details those who are eligible to receive an arable allocation. Part 4 makes provision for the establishment of rural townships and business centres in the reserves, where non-landowners will eventually be obliged to reside. And Part 5 contains regulations for the compulsory engagement of African labour for specific tasks in the reserves, such as road construction and soil conservation work.

Throughout all parts of the Act, penalties for non-compliance are included and, if the Native Land Husbandry Amendment Bill is passed, these are to be drastically increased. Ideally, no one is prosecuted for ignorance although the full letter of the law can be known to very few Africans. A farmer is only liable to prosecution after having been told what to do and then failing to obey instructions. The initial rules of good husbandry are relatively simple and can be easily learnt. As training and development proceed, however, the rules will be made more comprehensive.¹

If we re-express now the measures of the Act in non-legal terms, and if we examine the reasoning behind the adoption of these measures, the following basic aims of this reform programme become clear:

A. The traditional system of native land tenure is to be drastically altered. In place of tribal or so-called communal ownership of land, conditional freehold tenure is being introduced. This individual allocation of farming rights by the Government is intended to eradicate a number of 'evils' (I use the Government term) in the former system of land holdings and land usage.

1. It will provide security of tenure, particularly for the good farmer, and will bring about among all farmers those improvements which are deemed necessary to prevent further deterioration of physical resources and to increase agricultural productivity. The thesis here is, in Arthur Young's words, that 'the magic of property

¹ A. Pendered & W. von Memerty, 'Southern Rhodesia Native Husbandry,' *Rhodesian Farmer*, March 18th, 1955, p. 15.

turns sand into gold'. Young also said, 'give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock and he will turn it into a garden'. He could never have known how appropriate this remark would be for certain reserve areas of Southern Rhodesia.

2. Individual tenure will grant to every eligible native an acreage of land which, according to the rainfall regime in which the reserve is located, is considered to be an 'economic unit'. For example, arable areas with an average rainfall annually of more than 24 in. will be divided into standard holdings of 8 acres each; those with a rainfall of from 20 in. to 24 in., 13 acres, and so on. This so-called 'economic unit' is a piece of land which, if farmed according to recommended procedures laid down by the Department of Native Agriculture, will serve not only to keep the holder and his family fed at subsistence level but will prove capable of producing a crop surplus for cash sale. Thus, standards of living can be raised, *per capita* output increased and capital found for funding further improvements in farming techniques, such as the use of hybrid maize, commercial fertilizers and mechanized operation. The 'economic holding' is based on the requirements of a monogamous family of a man, wife, and three children, and it is the standard or yardstick to which appropriate acreages for polygamous families, widows, widowers and other eligible classes are related.

3. Individual tenure is designed to bring a halt to excessive fractioning or sub-division of lands, and to provide for the aggregation of holdings. It is acknowledged that in many reserves, because of over-population, it will be impossible to grant even the full standard holding to eligible farmers. Where this is so, the new system of tenure will, theoretically at least, prevent further sub-division by stabilizing holdings and permitting no splitting of lands under an arable right. The building up of fragments into economic units is encouraged by making an arable right negotiable by cash sale. Enterprising farmers under individual tenure may also, through negotiability, enlarge their lands beyond the economic holding up to a maximum of three times the standard area. In the case of the 20 in. to 24 in. rainfall zone, a native farmer may thus acquire up to 39 acres of arable land, providing he can find other farmers who are willing to sell their rights. The limitation of three times the standard holding is intended as a safeguard against 'any tendency to individual monopolization' by land right purchase.¹

B. In addition to the changes in land tenure which the Act is introducing, and to the hoped-for consequences stemming from individual tenure, animal husbandry issues have also been faced up to, and a number of regulations introduced.

1. The problem of achieving correct stocking rates in the reserves is met by declaring a safe maximum number of cattle for each

¹ Southern Rhodesia, *What the Native Land Husbandry Act means to the rural African and to Southern Rhodesia; A Five Year Plan that will Revolutionize African Agriculture* (Salisbury, 1955), p. 6.

reserve. This assessed carrying capacity is based on the recommendations of the Provincial Pasture Research Officer, the L.D.O. and administrative officials. Grazing permits are then issued to eligible farmers on the basis of a standard number of livestock per grazier, ensuring that the overall maximum for the reserve is not exceeded. Livestock owners holding more than the standard number of animal units¹ are obliged to destock. If the reserve is still over-stocked, i.e. the safe maximum number is still exceeded, farmers who own less than the standard number will be given a grazing permit only for the number of cattle they actually possess. If a man has only four head, he will only be allowed to keep four head.² However, the proposed Land Husbandry Amendment Act intends to permit, in some reserves, an additional number of animal units above the maximum assessed number, on payment of a *per capita* levy. The resultant income from 'authorized excesses' is to be used solely for promoting pasture improvement in the grazing areas where the levy is in operation.

As with arable rights, negotiability of grazing rights is possible, so that a good farmer may acquire through purchase up to three times the standard number of cattle in his reserve.

2. Provision is made under Part I of the original Act for a more positive approach to the problem of over-stocking, namely pasture management through a two or three camp deferred system of grazing rotation and the development of vleis for winter feeding.

3. To relate cattle ownership to arable land holding, which is a desirable feature in the interests of improved farming, natives who do not qualify for a farming right are, under the present Act, not permitted to own cattle. They are to dispose of their livestock within two years after land allocation in their reserve. The proposed Amendments to the Act may allow exceptions to this rule in certain circumstances.

4. The commonage system of grazing is left intact, in view of insuperable technical problems at this stage of land-use planning. The land classification system known as 'centralization' in this country, under which crop lands are amalgamated into large arable blocks, means that the establishment of self-contained farming units of, say, 70 to 160 acres is not feasible at present.

We turn now to a review of the successive stages in implementing the L.H.A. in the field. These stages were first laid down in the Five Year Plan, but have been somewhat modified as a result of experience over the first two years.

An essential pre-requisite to applying the Act in any reserve is the gathering of physical and human facts. An Initial Survey is undertaken, known as Kraal Appreciation. The L.D.O. visits each village

¹ An 'animal unit' means one head of large stock and a prescribed number of small stock. Usually five small stock (sheep, goats) equal one animal unit.

² The principles to be adopted in destocking are not covered in the L.H.A. but form the subject of separate regulations published in 1952.

with a prepared list of tax-payers and, through interrogation of the kraal head and the village inhabitants, he draws up a complete record of those holding land and those absent from the village at the time of the census (*mutupo*) taking. Widows, tax exempts and others are added to the kraal appreciation sheet as necessary. Later, measurements are made of all the lands in the village and the appropriate acreage entered opposite each land holder's name. Livestock are also counted. In sum, an accurate picture is obtained of population, land and livestock holdings for each village in the reserve, in a manner reminiscent of the eleventh century Doomsday Survey. To this statistical data is added information of the historical background of the tribe, climate, water supplies, soils, existing agricultural practices, communications and trading stores; in fact, everything that might assist in planning the future development of the reserve. The whole exercise is submitted to the Department of Native Agriculture as the L.D.O.'s Initial Survey Report.

I can do no more than draw attention to the kraal appreciation sheets as primary research material of the utmost significance in African studies. At each Native Department in 90 per cent of the Districts throughout the country, there are completed kraal appreciation sheets for every village in each of the reserves in that District. Very shortly, all Districts will have completed their Initial Survey. For the anthropologist, the *mutupo* and *chidau*—or clan and sub-clan names—are recorded opposite all male members of the village community. Monogamous and polygamous marriages are also noted.

As a geographer, I have processed the kraal appreciation sheets for 385 villages in three reserves and propose to prepare a series of maps featuring, among others, the following distributional patterns:

1. Size and location of kraals, with relation to terrain, water supplies, lines of communication, and arable and grazing lands.
2. Constituent make-up of permanent residents—monogamous and polygamous families, ratio of males to females, number of widows.
3. Degree of absenteeism among adult males—bachelors, married men with and without wives.
4. Ratio of land holders to landless.
5. Ratio of livestock owners to non-stock owners.
6. Extremes of land holdings, maximum and minimum acreages.

Base maps have had to be prepared in the field and the kraals correctly located, since no maps were available indicating village sites. On the other hand, most reserves have a recent and invaluable stereoscopic air photo coverage at 1/20,000, and interpretation of these photos saves many miles of ground travel, whatever the planning exercise.

Uzumba Reserve in Mrewa District, 60 miles east of Salisbury, yields some interesting figures from kraal appreciation. Allocation of lands under tribal tenure ranges from maximum holding of

60-70 acres to minimum holdings of 0.3 and 0.4 acres. Whether this variance is due strictly to differing kinship responsibilities or to a corruption of authority on the part of the kraal head remains to be judged.

With regard to absenteeism, of the total adult male population of the reserve, 46.7 per cent were away at work at the time of the census. Of married men with one wife, only 22.2 per cent were absent, while 80.9 per cent of all single men were away in towns or on European farms.

Following the initial survey, land evaluation is necessary. Since 1929, a simple system of land classification has been adopted, introduced by E. D. Alvord, the first Director of Native Agriculture. This system, as already mentioned, is referred to as 'centralization'. As the name implies, its purpose is to consolidate or centralize scattered pieces of crop land into arable blocks. In this way, a more efficient use of grazing land is achieved and supervision of arable land is possible. Under centralization, the kraals are moved from scattered locations to a position along the boundary between arable and grazing areas. About 40 per cent of the total acreage of native reserves had been centralized by 1955. However, earlier centralization work has been crude in places, with insufficient attention paid to maintaining a reasonable ratio between grazing and arable lands (ideally, 10 acres of grazing to one acre of arable, at present levels of land use, in good rainfall areas).

A considerable amount of re-centralization is therefore necessary, hand-in-hand with the development of roads and water supplies, to ensure the best use of favourable soils and to preserve the grazings. All three reserves in which the writer worked had been centralized, but the earliest survey, that of 1935 in Seke Reserve, Goromonzi District, produced almost a 3:1 ratio of grazing to arable, which has since had to be modified.

Once the arable blocks have been agreed upon, a conservation network of grass buffer strips along the contour, drainage channels, service roads, demarcation banks and storm drains must be superimposed upon the soil. This conservation planning is of the utmost significance to the permanent tillage which lands are to receive, and also serves as an essential framework for later land allocation, or the issuing of individual farming rights. /

In the meantime, an Assessment Committee is appointed to consider the Initial Survey report of the L.D.O. and to make specific recommendations as to the standard area of arable land for a farming right, the maximum carrying capacity of the reserve for stock, and the standard number of animal units for a grazing right.

Where there is insufficient arable land to grant every qualified farmer the standard area, the Committee recommends that allocation be in terms of section 27(2) of the Act, commonly known as the 'tight formula'. All land holders with more than the standard

holding will be brought down to the maximum permissible acreage. Those with less will continue to farm their present holding.

Where some of the existing acreages are patently too small for any form of satisfactory farming, an alternate 'intermediate formula' is recommended, under Section 31 of the Act. By this arrangement, those cultivating more than the standard area of, say, 8 acres, are allocated only 8 acres. Those with 7 or 6 acres are allocated only 7 or 6 acres. Those with 5 acres or under are then allocated 5 acres.

The Assessment Committee Reports for each reserve also provide invaluable research material, incorporating as they do the L.D.O.'s initial survey report and kraal appreciation data, together with minutes of the meeting of the Assessment Committee itself.

Once the conservation pattern is laid out in the crop lands, and Assessment Committee recommendations gazetted, the crucial stage of the Act, land allocation, can commence. An outline map of each arable block is produced, preferably by plane-table, showing the skeleton grid of those conservation features which are to serve as boundary markers for individual holdings. With this map and the relevant kraal appreciation sheets, the L.D.O. with a team of African demonstrators enters the block, measures the fields, and proceeds to indicate appropriate-sized pieces of land for those eligible to receive farming rights. The kraal head and his people are consulted on the order in which lands are to be allocated.

Each allocation receives a number which is entered in the kraal appreciation sheet opposite the farmer receiving the allocation; its position is then noted on the map, and an official registration sheet is prepared on return to Native Department Headquarters. This system of title registration is at once simple yet adequate, providing the map has some semblance of accuracy.

After receiving individual title to lands, and once the conservation framework is considered adequate, each cultivator is given six months in which to construct his narrow-based contour terraces, along the axis of the grass buffer strips, and to correct specifications.

Following land allocation, attention must be paid to the grazing areas. Cattle permits are issued and destocking, if necessary (as it usually is), is commenced. Plans are drawn up for dividing the grazing lands into paddocks, to be shared by graziers from a group of adjacent kraals. The total acreage included in these beacons should approximate the requirements of the cattle which will graze them. Seasonal resting of paddocks is commenced and bush clearing by stumping or ring-barking is initiated, in an effort to stimulate the growth of pasture grasses.

Finally a Reserve Plan is prepared, recommending the course of agricultural development in the years following implementation of the Act. The policy is for the entire agricultural staff to swing over to advisory and extension services based on this Reserve Plan, which sets out the approved cropping methods and techniques, livestock

and pasture management practices, and associated development recommended for the area.¹

In Bikita Reserve, 60 miles east of Fort Victoria, land allocation for Zone 1 was completed in 1957. 23.4 per cent of those who received farming rights were absent from the reserve at the time of kraal appreciation, although their wives were cultivating in their name. This same figure of 23 per cent is probably a fair indication of absentee landowners today. Being an 'intermediate formula' allocation, the average size of a holding was 5.3 acres. I interviewed a 1 per cent random sample of land holders in Zones 1 and 2 of Bikita to ascertain the standard of their farming and to gather data on family budgets. Provisional calculations show that 34 of the 45 farmers questioned (or 75.5 per cent) were able to raise a crop surplus beyond family requirements for cash sale. However, the average annual income from sale of surplus crops amounted to only £12 15s. 0d. per family. 13.3 per cent of the farmers were only able to grow enough food to meet their own requirements, while 11.2 per cent were unable to produce sufficient food for their families and had to purchase grain.

The Significance of the Act

Turning finally to a summing up and evaluation of the Act, one may make some general, overall remarks and then raise more specific comments on certain technical and socio-economic issues.

We must accept the premise that a radical agricultural reform in the reserves had become inevitable. To continue the valiant but puny efforts of the last 30 years, within the framework of an African system of land usage that had become archaic, would have failed to resolve the increasingly grave situation.

In this respect, the following excerpt from the annual report of the Natural Resources Board for 1954 is most relevant:

The time for plain speaking has now arrived, and it is no exaggeration to say that at the moment we are heading for disaster. We have on the one hand a rapid increase taking place in the African population and on the other a rapid deterioration of the very land on which these people depend for their existence and upon which so much of the future prosperity of the country depends . . . the happenings in the Native reserves must be viewed in the light of an emergency and not as a matter that can be rectified when times improve, for by then the opportunity to reclaim will have passed.²

With these thoughts in mind, we are forced into making a decision. We either declare our faith in the L.H.A. as being the means of saving the situation in the reserves, or we deny its worth by raising such serious objections as to show that its enactment will create more

¹ Department of Native Agriculture, *Reserve Plan, Chinamora* (Salisbury, 1956).

² Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Natural Resources Board* for the year ended 31st December, 1954 (Salisbury, 1955), p. 45.

problems than it resolves, and may ultimately jeopardize the whole future of race relations in this country.

Faced with the choice, I at this moment am not convinced that the L.H.A. is unsound, or that its implementation will lead to new crises more serious than the existing one.

Fresh problems will occur to be sure. As one of the co-architects of the Act has written, 'The firm grasping of the parent nettle is a tremendous step forward, but there still remains a large crop of subsidiary problems which demand vigorous attention if the basic solution now set in motion is to succeed.'¹

It has never been claimed that this reform programme provides an outright panacea for all the ills of the African rural economy. It is, however, a stabilizing Act on a nation-wide scale, creating a solid foundation upon which, through regional planning, it will be possible to establish a settled agricultural community employing better farming methods; and the deterioration of the physical resource base can be firmly checked, if not ultimately reversed. Fortunately the Act is flexible and not sacrosanct; amendments to meet developing conditions may always be introduced.

Given the existing conditions of man and land, I have not been able to conceive of any working alternative that might have better faced the issues at stake.

However, beyond our approval of the principles of the Act, and admiration for the handful of officers whose duty it is to execute the Five Year Plan (under deplorable financial restrictions), we can find fault with many features of the *modus operandi* of the Act, and occasionally direct serious criticism at its shortcomings, in the field of, say, human relationships. But at no time are these failings strong enough to warrant a condemnation of the L.H.A. as unworkable and liable to provoke major discord in the future.

The speed at which agricultural changes are being introduced is cause for concern. The accelerated implementation of the Act is defended on the grounds that soil erosion is on the rampage and measures for checking this must be applied as swiftly as possible. The African population is increasing rapidly and, if land allocation were to be delayed another 10 years, the average standard holding would be down to 4 acres. For political and financial reasons, too, a Five Year Plan was counted a necessity by the Government. But consider the consequences of speed. Shoddy and inaccurate work can result in the field. Errors in census-taking create serious difficulties at allocation time. Pacing of lands by foot rather than chain and compass survey can lead to errors in acreage calculation of 20-25 per cent. Hasty conservation planning produces errors in contour and drain strip alignment, and the consequent weak spots can induce severe erosion.

Land capability planning for centralization and grazing rotation

¹ Southern Rhodesia, *African Affairs in Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1957), p. 18.

will suffer from hasty effort. The dilemma faced by the Department of African Affairs in this respect is clearly brought out in the Chief Native Commissioner's Circular No. 309 of October 18th. Concerning land classification, it states that 'the impetus in implementing the Land Husbandry Act must not be lost through over-complicating the methods of selecting land for settlement'. Field staff are to undertake land evaluation 'in such a way as not to prolong the period needed for implementation of the Land Husbandry Act'. Elsewhere, however, it confirms that 'where large scale conservation problems will be caused by settlement on unsatisfactory land . . . allocation must not proceed before the position has been reviewed'.¹

In the introduction to a plan for intensifying the development of African agriculture in Kenya, Swynnerton emphasizes that agricultural reform cannot be planned 'within time-tight compartments'. While a Five Year Plan may be necessary, for the convenience of financial estimation, development policies should be capable of redirection as a result of experience, investigation and surveys; the long-term goals should not be lost sight of in the urgency which accompanies a year-by-year plan of betterment.²

One is reminded of a Latin phrase which could well provide the motto for all agricultural development plans in Africa, *festina lente*, make haste slowly.

The impact of sudden innovation upon primitive farmers can induce grave sociological consequences, particularly if the reasons behind such haste are not comprehended. For example, social cohesion and group activity may be impaired by abrupt tenurial change.

At this point, another basic decision must be made. The decision is, quite simply, soil preservation versus preservation of traditional tribal structures. Land development versus land deterioration.

We must recognize that the traditional systems of land use in many parts of Africa, however appropriate to the past circumstances, are quite unsuitable to the radically different conditions of the present.³ Change is inevitable therefore and it is beside the point to argue whether it is desirable or not. Attempts to bolster up tribal ways of agriculture and land tenure must inevitably succumb to the impact of modern economic forces.⁴

Tribal agricultural systems have persisted long after the social conditions which called them into being have disappeared, and rarely have they accommodated themselves to the new conditions. In Southern Rhodesia, indigenous land customs were tested out for

¹ Office of the Secretary for Native Affairs, *Circular No. 309, Native Land Husbandry Act* (Salisbury, 1958), pp. 8-9.

² Colony & Protectorate of Kenya, *A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya* (Nairobi, 1955), p. 1.

³ R. O. Hennings, 'Some Trends and Problems of African Land Tenure in Kenya', *Journal of African Administration IV* (October, 1952), p. 134.

⁴ D. Hobart Houghton & Edith M. Walton, *The Economy of a Native Reserve*, Vol. II of Keiskammahoeek Rural Survey (Pietermaritzburg, 1952), p. 188.

their survival value from 1926 onwards. They failed to adjust to the demands of an emergent rural society. As Professor Mitchell has observed, if an African is to become a successful farmer in Rhodesia today, he must throw off the shackles of the ever-ramifying kinship system, with its traditional demands upon the man who reaps a bumper crop.¹

It is mere sentiment to call reserve conditions 'a way of life', when that way provides total earnings of only a few pounds a year. Preservation of tribal customs in the face of abject poverty is a totally unacceptable proposition.²

There follows the problem of winning the people to the programme of land and community development which has been planned for them. As Mr. Howman has aptly stated, we must aim to conserve good will as well as the soil; we must have the African with us in this reform of reserve agriculture.

Certainly, radical changes in land use and tenure cannot be imposed by Government order alone. The people themselves must be induced, in Furnivall's memorable phrase, to 'want what they need'. As Gross in America has written, 'Experts can work out beautiful expositions of problems, but unless a self interest to achieve these results is established, the expensive work of the expert has little or no value.'

Ultimately all the problems of land use centre around the farmer and his family. If we fail to take his views into account, we shall never improve his farming. In many ways, Mashona and Matabele farmers are already a long-suffering people; it would be fatal to regard their interests in the future as either non-existent or indefinitely pliable.³

Compulsory and arbitrary dictation as to what shall or shall not be done cannot achieve the aims of the L.H.A. This is why the proposed increased penalties for non-compliance should be looked upon with concern. One needs to establish a relationship between farmer, administrator and extension worker which will result in mutual understanding and confidence, not in distrust, suspicion and unrest.

So far as my experiences in the reserves are concerned, it is fair to say that the vast majority of the farmers are either indifferent to, or only mildly interested in, the promised advances for their area when the Act is fully implemented. The minority of malcontents comprises those who have suffered considerable reductions in land and cattle, or those who have been caught in violation of some phase of the Act. The severest critics are presumably the landless, most of whom are absent from the reserves and whose reactions are thus not known to the L.D.O.

Regarding the preservation of good will, an increase in well-trained

¹ Prudence Smith (ed.) *Africa in Transition* (London, 1958), p. 60.

² A. L. Jolly, 'Group Farming', *Tropical Agriculture*, 27 (1950), p. 150.

³ B. Malinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

African staff in higher positions, as L.D.O.'s for example, will greatly assist the attainment of a spirit of partnership in the reserves. If this appears idealistic at the present stage of race relations in the Colony, it should become a goal for practical realization in the immediate future.

Turning to the question of land tenure, the decision to substitute individual for tribal ownership of farming rights requires examination. A large body of literature on the problems of tenure in Africa is available, and many different viewpoints are represented therein, ranging from those of administrators, lawyers, and anthropologists, to those of agriculturists, economists and political scientists. It is evident from the contributions of these writers that there is considerable uncertainty as to the most favourable forms of tenure necessary to meet the demand for more intensive settlement and utilization of land by Africans.

On one matter, however, there is virtual unanimity. If agricultural improvements are to be achieved, the tradition that it is the right of every African family to possess land and to own cattle has to be abandoned.¹

The designers of the L.H.A. in Southern Rhodesia accepted this. The question then arose; under what terms should those who qualify to remain on the land occupy their holding? The choice of individual tenure was based on the assumption that such a system would induce a feeling of security in the landowner, and that this feeling would automatically lead to improvements in agricultural operation.

This proposition requires challenging. Indeed, 'one of the important questions now arising is whether or not the system of tenure that is emerging will best facilitate the development of sound farming patterns'.² There are historic precedents to the L.H.A. in other parts of Africa, where lands of a whole social unit have been parcelled out in holdings as individual property held under European and not tribal law.³ The adoption of this tenurial form by the L.H.A. is therefore not an innovation, as has sometimes been claimed.⁴

The best known areas of individual allocation are certain districts of the Transkei in the Union of South Africa, especially Keiskammahoek (surveyed under the Glen Grey Act of 1894), and also lands allotted in freehold to some 3,700 Buganda landowners by the Uganda Agreement of 1900 in East Africa.

A study of the prevailing situations in Keiskammahoek and in Uganda should provide indicators as to what may be expected after individual allocation in Southern Rhodesia. We are fortunate in possessing a very thorough four-volume sociological study of the Keiskammahoek undertaken in 1954. In this work, which com-

¹ Houghton & Walton, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

² S. M. Makings, *The Problem of the Communal Grazings* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 1.

³ L. P. Mair, *Studies in Applied Anthropology* (London, 1957), p. 56.

⁴ The system is not even unique in Southern Rhodesia. Holdings in the Fingo location at Bembesi, near Bulawayo, are based on quit-rent individual tenure.

compares three contiguous systems of tenure, the traditional or tribal, freehold and quit-rent systems, it is interesting to see how far the African conception of mutual obligations of kinship and of other traditional social relationships have modified the European systems of land rights.¹ The history of the Transkei also invalidates the assumption that once individual title has been granted, the land in question continues to be the property of a single person. In Keiskammahoek, the land holders behave as far as possible as they would if they had acquired their land in the traditional way through tribal allocation, i.e. sharing it with relatives where necessary.²

It is quite apparent then that no new piece of legislation in Southern Rhodesia will dissolve overnight the claims of kinship. In Bikita Reserve, I found several holders of farming rights who were allowing their landless relatives to till part of their allocations, even under 'intermediate formula' conditions. In effect, fractioning of land continues, and although one farmer can be held ultimately responsible for infringements of good husbandry practice, the Government will be faced now with a new problem in the reserves, that of squatters.

In sum, as Professor Mair has written, 'no modern plans for the improvement of agriculture should rely on the principle of "the magic of property"'. The political arguments for granting of individual property rights may well be decisive in the end, but they should be distinguished from attempts to advocate it as a contribution to the productivity of agriculture.'³

Further problems deriving from individual allocation concern the size of holdings and the provision in the Act for the acquisition of additional lands by progressive farmers. Dr. Makings has given thoughtful consideration to these issues in a series of advisory memoranda.

In dividing up the whole land among individual farmers, some standards of allocation obviously had to be adopted. Presumably the acreage of a standard holding was arrived at on the basis that it would offer a farmer the chance of making a reasonable living, although one suspects that it was equally governed by estimates of arable land available for allocation and the number of families who would have a claim to farming rights.

To call such a holding an 'economic unit' is unrealistic, however. It may be shown that the farming of such a minute piece of land is quite uneconomic, if by economic one implies a return from farming commensurate with earnings from a similar level of activity in other occupations.⁴ The working of such holdings may provide acceptable subsistence, and the system is therefore viable, but it will never be economic, in the sense that it will provide an income above the rewards paid for unskilled labour in urban areas.

¹ L. P. Mair, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ S. M. Makings, *Economic Appraisal of the Broad Prospects for African Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 2.

Economic holdings can only come about through the consolidation of lands. Unsupervised aggregation of holdings will lead to a checkerboard of separated bits and pieces of arable land making up an enlarged but fragmented holding. This pattern is one of the very undesirable features of tribal allocation of lands which the Act has set out to eliminate. To check this trend, a Planning Committee or Land Authority will probably be required, to bring about compact, enlarged holdings by encouraging the exchange of lands among registered holders. The task of recording these changes in the Land Husbandry Registers, and in re-mapping allocations, will place an extremely heavy burden on the administrative staff. In Bikita Reserve at present, the N.C. and chiefs vet all applications for the sale and re-purchase of farming rights. Extension of such a system, incorporating the Native Councillors, might fulfill the requirements of a land planning committee.

It may be observed that implementation of the Act is bringing about a hybrid system of tenure, with arable land in individual occupation and grazings still held communally. Of the 30.5 million acres in reserves and S.N.A.'s, about 26.5 millions have been classed as usable. 10.5 per cent of this usable area will be individually allocated for cultivation, and nearly 90 per cent will remain as grazing commonage.

Dr. Makings has pointed out the marked difference in productivity between arable and grazing lands: 'at the present time the average value of crop output is reckoned at about £4 per arable acre and that of livestock output is put at about 3s. per acre of the communal grazings. Thus, although the arable is very poorly farmed, it yields up about 27 times as much per acre as does the land under grazing.'¹

If African agriculture is to be intensively developed, it is quite obvious that the present ratio of arable to grazing land will have to be changed. Additional crop land will need to be opened up at the expense of the grazing. This encroachment has already begun with the introduction of Turkish tobacco plots into the grazings this coming season. It will mean, of course, an all-out effort to improve the carrying capacity of the remaining grazing areas through fenced paddocks, seasonal rotation, vle development, improved pasture grasses, fodder crops and so on. The traditional concept of grazing commonage as a mere 'bank for the storage of bridewealth' will have to yield to the concepts of well-managed paddocks for the commercial rearing of young stock and the production of animal fertilizer, the so-called 'sausage machine' concept of the agriculturist. The nitrogenous requirements of African crop lands can never be fully satisfied.²

If free-grazing of cattle represents such a wasteful use of land,

¹ S. M. Makings, *The Problem of the Communal Grazings*, p. 1.

² Southern Rhodesia, *Agricultural Policy in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 26.

compared to crop production, the logical conclusion to the progressive reduction of grazing areas is stall-feeding or the supplying of fodder crops and hay from grass leys to cattle in pens. It has been suggested that stall-feeding should be increasingly taught to, and encouraged among, African farmers.¹ While this may be a commendable aim, anyone knowing the rural African and his attitude towards such labour-consuming activity will realize that the hope of its attainment is exceedingly remote.² Under strong pressure from demonstrators in Rhodesian reserves, increased quantities of maize stover, ensilage and vlei hay are being supplied to cattle in their kraals during the winter months; but such amounts will never be more than a minor supplement to the main nutritional intake from the bush and veld.

Turning to another facet of the L.H.A., there is the serious problem of what is to happen to those who no longer have a legal stake in their tribal lands. Will the rural townships which are planned for each reserve provide adequate, alternative occupations for unskilled workers dispossessed of their farming rights? What plans are being made in the main urban reception centres to absorb the surplus labour which will be flowing from the reserves now that restrictions have been put upon the human carrying capacity of the African areas? What legislation is afoot to provide an alternative form of security to the traditional native dependence upon cattle and the soil, security of tenure in the municipalities, e.g. unemployment benefits, health insurance, and old age pensions?

Unfortunately the answers to these questions are not forthcoming at this time. And, although this subsidiary crop of problems is an obvious concomitant to the L.H.A., the Act itself contains very little comfort with regard to these issues.

It is a matter of considerable concern to many people, particularly administrative officials engaged in implementing the Act, that no parallel legislation has been created by the Government to face up to the repercussions upon urban structures which the rural reforms must sooner or later induce.

The excessive departmentalization of government services has led to a situation in which, many critics declare, the right hand has not known what the left hand has been doing.

The prevailing unsatisfactory situation may thus be attributed to lack of co-ordination in the central government, together with difficulties in legislating for the responsibilities which urban areas have towards their African residents. It is earnestly to be hoped that greater co-operation on all sides will be forthcoming after implementation of the Act.

In the meantime, there is some reassurance to be had from the

¹ G. B. Masefield, 'The Development of African Agriculture', *African Affairs*, 53. (1954), p. 47.

² William Allan, 'African Land Usage', *Human Problems in British Central Africa*, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal No. III (June, 1945), p. 18.

knowledge that any sudden exodus of population from the reserves is quite unlikely to take place as a result of the Act. An upsurge in agricultural productivity from Reserve Plan extension work, together with a continuation of regard for kinship responsibilities, will help to maintain considerable numbers of Africans in the reserves, even though they have no official claim to either land or cattle.

There is still time to plan for the eventual increases in migration from reserves to town, at the point when economic pressures begin to overcome the viable nature of contemporary reserve farming. But procrastination in the planning for a stable and permanent African urban population can only lead to the most serious sociological and political consequences.

There are other difficulties to which, due to space, one cannot even make reference. But my concluding remarks may be concentrated on the probable patterns of settlement and land use in the reserves in, say, 1980, or 20 years after the first Five Year Plan for implementing the L.H.A.

It is trite to say that the search for an ideal organization of African farmers continues. In the African areas of Southern Rhodesia, the Government has committed itself to establishing small arable holdings in a mixed farming economy. Yet the history of the size of agricultural holdings and land tenure trends in other parts of the world suggests that such tiny peasant farms will eventually be forced by economic circumstances into a strong decline in numbers.¹

What will take their place is more than a matter of mere speculation. The evolution of larger, self-contained farms, with individual enclosure of grazing and employed labour, has been postulated, along the lines of miniature Native Purchase Area farms. This presumes a large-scale exodus of surplus population from the reserves into industry and European farming, a supposition which, as has been noted, is supported neither by the present rate of industrial development and urban planning, nor the expansion in European farming. The development of self-contained, enclosed farms in the reserves also assumes the abandonment of centralization and disruption of the well-established settlement patterns of a gregarious people.

I believe instead that consolidation of holdings within existing arable lands will occur under appropriate supervision, and also the opening up of new blocks as cropping methods are intensified, artificial fertilizers become the norm, and pasture management in the grazings developed. At the same time, the Government should officially encourage co-operation among land holders in the several phases of their farming. Individual holding of land is not incompatible with co-operative methods of farming, as the Russians have shown with some success. The development of community effort around the framework of individual tenure is not contradiction in

¹ Southern Rhodesia, *Agricultural Policy in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Salisbury, 1958), p. 39.

sound land use planning; co-operative marketing for Africans, for example, has already made an excellent beginning in this country. Furthermore, group farming would revive and promote the best in the traditional social organization of African tribes, that spirit of co-operation among farmers of which the work party (*nhimbe*) is a good illustration. Group farming is, in effect, a modern version of much of the old indigenous system of land usage.¹ And it is a system which is being promoted by agriculturists in several parts of Africa today, particularly in Kenya.

The essence of planned group farming is to obtain the advantages of both large and small scale production for the group, which in Southern Rhodesia would comprise the kraals farming a number of arable blocks. The system permits the use of mechanical equipment and economies in oxen and machinery, and can progress through Co-operative Better Farming Societies, controlling their members, obtaining loans, acquiring their own implements, and marketing their own produce.² There will be scope for specialization, in the shape of tractor drivers, stockmen, transport drivers, marketing clerks and so on.³ The landless can thus find alternative employment in the reserves, and preferably live in the kraals around the blocks rather than be herded into rambling townships, with all the social problems they will bring with them. One already finds signs of specialization of jobs in the reserves. In Bikita, for example, scotch carts are being hired at 1s. 6d. per load, or 7s. a day, while tractors are ploughing at rates from 30s. to £2 an acre.

Planned group farming will entail direction in use of individual lands, to conform to the requirements of the group. For example, similar use of contoured lands from drainstrip to drainstrip will be necessary for mechanized cultivation. But such direction and loss of free choice in the use of lands would be no more severe than the present regulations for cropping under the L.H.A.

Doubts have been expressed concerning the entrepreneurial faculty of the Shona and the Ndebele, and their ability to respond to the problems of strong management which group farming would require. One has, however, the example of the Chagga coffee growers of Kilimanjaro, whose co-operative efforts have flourished since small beginnings 33 years ago. In West Africa, the cocoa farmers have similarly proved the advantages of group farming.

With improved education and continued guidance from extension workers in the African Affairs Department, and with Turkish tobacco as their cash crop, perhaps the rural Africans of Southern Rhodesia can likewise rise above the poverty of subsistence farming to assume a more productive role in the agricultural economy of their country.

¹ Director of Agriculture, 'Planned Group Farming in Nyanza Province, Kenya', *Tropical Agriculture*, 27 (1950), p. 155.

² *Ibid.*, p. 155.

³ G. F. Clay, 'Peasant Agriculture', *Tropical Agriculture*, 27 (1950), p. 83.

LIBERAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

A Review Article

by

L. H. GANN

The Story of South Africa. By LEO MARQUARD. Faber and Faber (London), 1955. Pp. 250. 15s.

The Last Trek, a study of the Boer people and the Afrikaner Nation. By SHEILA PATTERSON. Kegan Paul (London), 1957. Pp. viii + 336. 28s.

THE post-war years have seen a boom in British books on South Africa. At no time since perhaps the Boer War has the interest of the English-speaking public in the past of that part of the world been greater than it is now. The reasons for this interest are not far to seek. Southern Africa is important to Britain economically, and British capital has found great new opportunities there. The spectacular decline of Western power in the Indian Ocean and the Near East that has occurred since the end of the Second World War has emphasized the strategic significance of the sub-continent. South Africa, moreover, is presenting Britain with a political problem of a new type. For the Union is the only country in the world where a numerous English-speaking population constitutes a national minority in relation to another European people and has to adapt itself to that unwelcome status. South Africa is, moreover, the only country ever to have been under British rule which has repudiated the traditions of British liberal thought in theory as well as in practice. Other countries in the Commonwealth may not adhere to these traditions in fact, though they may pay lip service to them. The Union alone rejects most of the ideology on which they are founded, emphatically repudiating the belief, almost universally accepted elsewhere, that Europeans must somehow come to terms with the new nationalism of the so-called 'colonial' races.

Mr. Leo Marquard's book on South Africa will therefore find a wide public. Within a compass of only two hundred and fifty pages, it presents the general reader with a complete survey of South African history from its early beginnings to the present. The book is well written, well illustrated and provided with a number of useful maps. It also possesses other merits. Mr. Marquard is keenly aware that the story of his country is not just a dreary tale of never-ending 'Kaffir Wars', but also the story of different forms

of social organization in contact and conflict. Mr. Marquard also avoids the mistake of treating South African history in isolation, and attempts to place it within that wider setting in which it belongs.

The author's task has therefore been a difficult one. The writer of a short, popular work has a much harder time than the man who writes a learned monograph, for the former must necessarily leave out a great deal of what he would like to include, and compression always leads to loss of accuracy. Nevertheless, a popular writer should still attempt to avoid unnecessary generalizations lacking an adequate basis, even if these do find wide acceptance. This Mr. Marquard has not always done.

In sketching in the overseas background, for instance, he repeats a good many conventional observations of English school-histories that have long stood in need of revision. The belief that it was the discovery of America and of the sea route to the Indies which shifted Europe's economic centre of gravity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic is one that dies hard. Yet a glance at the map should alone make its absurdity obvious. The distances between Marseilles, Genoa and Venice on the one hand, and Jamaica or Calcutta on the other, are not appreciably different from those between Jamaica or Calcutta and London, Amsterdam and Hamburg. There were no *geographical* reasons why the Genoese should not have traded as successfully with the East as did the Netherlanders. The cause of the relative decline of the Mediterranean ports must be sought elsewhere.

The decline of the Mediterranean countries was a very long drawn out process. The destruction of the Spanish Armada by the sailors of Queen Elizabeth did not therefore mean the end of Spanish sea power, as Mr. Marquard asserts. In the end England had to conclude an unfavourable peace which deprived her for a time of the vital weapon of privateering, then an indispensable defence for a relatively weak sea power. Spain remained a great power till well into the seventeenth century and retained many of her monopolies in the New World until the eighteenth.

Mr. Marquard's reference to the French Revolution so dangerously simplifies events that it should be omitted altogether. Even more mistaken is his assertion that the 'Unreformed Parliament' in the United Kingdom merely represented landowners whose main concern was to keep the price of corn high and ruthlessly to suppress anything that looked even remotely like Radicalism or Jacobinism. The 'Unreformed Parliament' represented a complex balance between various interests, landed, mercantile, planting and others, including men whom we might in some ways regard today as higher civil servants. Its repressive powers were extremely small, for the country lacked an effective police force, and its army was always weak in peace time and often wavering in its sympathies.

The belief that the English eighteenth-century religious revival had no parallel on the Continent is not in accordance with the facts.

Neither is the statement that the battle of Trafalgar foiled French plans for an invasion of England.

In 1839 Lord Durham did not advocate 'full responsible government' for Canada. Durham actually wished to reserve certain important powers to the authorities in London. Incidentally, though much admired by later liberals, Durham also believed that the French Canadians must ultimately be 'anglified'. He would thus hardly have disagreed with the anglicizing Lord Somerset at the Cape on the linguistic score.

All these are errors which could be put right without much trouble in any future editions of Mr. Marquard's book. Mr. Marquard's judgments on South African history proper, however, raise much wider issues which cannot be rectified so easily.

To start with, there is Mr. Marquard's interpretation of the Boer. Though he has some valuable things to say about him, the *trek boer* nevertheless appears in this history as a kind of eternal anachronism. On page 69 of his book 'the seventeenth century has wandered into the eighteenth' as far as the trekker is concerned, whilst on page 153 the Boers 'carried on the social and economic habits of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth'.

This belief is based on a somewhat partisan interpretation. The *trek boer* was not really an anachronism in his day. He was rather a kind of specialist, a man whose wilderness skills, whose extensive pastoral economy, and whose unusual military tactics enabled him to form the sharp cutting edge of European penetration inland. In many ways the *trek boer* resembled the Yankee pioneer of North America. The North American frontiersman also confined his efforts to working a few acres extensively. Once he had exhausted the soil and shot out the game, he moved on. Lacking adequate markets, he could not develop the country intensively. This was done by peasants from older and settled countries who followed in his wake, once the frontier receded. But unlike the farm hand from Somerset or Saxony the pioneer could make his living in an untamed wilderness where survival depended on skills that men could not acquire in Europe.

The harsh, uncompromising Calvinism that inspired the voortrekkers might be discussed in similar terms as the product of frontier conditions, as much as the inheritance of seventeenth-century Holland. Marcus Lee Hansen, an American historian, has pointed out how on the American frontier, one sect after another adopted the Puritanical way of life, whatever their religious doctrines. Drunkenness or sexual intemperance, for instance, were always a potent threat to the cohesion of loosely knit frontier communities on the exposed fringe of settlement. But a rigid spiritual discipline could maintain the morale of the pioneers under those conditions.

The needs of a pastoral community also stamped the labour policies of the voortrekker states. In this connexion Marquard,

like 'Exeter Hall' in the past, is inclined to over-stress the importance of slavery in the Boer Republics. A semi-pastoral way of life needed relatively few hands and native tenants supplied most of the demand. Herd boys were of course always in demand as 'apprentices', just as they were in demand always among the cattle-keeping Bantu peoples. But the Boers did not run plantations, and they did not therefore participate in the slave trade to any appreciable extent.

Mr. Marquard's interpretation of the struggle between Rhodes and Kruger, between Boer nationalism and British Imperialism, is also one that requires substantial modification. The struggle in which the Transvaal became involved was not simply 'the late-nineteenth century against the early eighteenth, industrialism against pastoralism', though the advocates of British Imperial expansion tended to express the points at issue in just those terms. The Boers were quite well aware of the advantages which they might derive from the new mineral industry on their soil, an industry which yielded revenue which allowed them to buy Krupp guns. Monopolies and taxes there might be in the Transvaal, but the state-imposed burdens on the gold mining industry on the Witwatersrand were much lower than those which existed in neighbouring Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company's administration. The Jameson Raid was supported by financial interests associated with the British South Africa Company, but many other important mining magnates wanted nothing to do with it.

Imperialism, in Mr. Marquard's language, then 'bared its teeth' and won a barren victory in the field. The conquest of the two Afrikaner Republics was later followed by the creation of the Union of South Africa, in which Boer and Briton compromised by largely excluding the non-Europeans from political influence. In discussing these developments Mr. Marquard displays all the intellectual inconsistencies which have plagued most British 'progressives' for so long. On the one hand Imperialism and armaments are condemned. On the other hand, policies are advocated which are capable of being enforced only by an overwhelming display of military strength, by an effort entirely incompatible with the profoundly pacific leaning of liberals.

Sheila Patterson's book goes on to elaborate Marquard's story. Hers is a study of the Afrikaner people, and in it she attempts to show how the Afrikaners have become what they are today, paying special attention to modern Afrikaner nationalism. After a historical introduction, she discusses the present in terms of the demographic, political, economic, religious, cultural and general social situation. In a final chapter she concludes that 'the national-minded Afrikaner has no future in the world of today'.

The author's work embodies a great deal of reading and research. Some of her material has been handled very well and, as in Marquard's book, the social and economic sections are the strongest.

On the whole the work is, moreover, free from sociological jargon despite occasional stylistic lapses, such as a reference to the 'buried treasure of totalitarian ideas which glints disquietingly under the shallow foundations of Nationalism'.

A more serious objection to a work designed to show the evolution of the Afrikaner nation, is the fact that the historical section is much too brief. It only covers forty-one pages and even a rough outline is scarcely possible within such a narrow compass. Several of her historical statements are, moreover, open to grave doubt. The belief that the Huguenot immigrants to South Africa were characterized not only by 'stern Calvinist fanaticism' but also by 'a rejection of Europe and all her ways' is based on a stereotype of little value. So is the quite unproven contention that 'their darker colouring and stronger features often dominate the blonder northern strains to the present day'. After all, no satisfactory accounts exist of the genetic characteristics of the two immigrant groups!

Her account of the factors involved in the phenomenon of 'trekking' is somewhat oversimplified. She might have made more use of P. J. van der Merwe's outstanding work *Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap* (1945), which does not figure in her bibliography, though one of van der Merwe's early works does.

The statement that so far there has been a far greater tendency for the Afrikaners to become anglicized than for the English-speaking to be Afrikanerized is likewise open to question. A comparative analysis of the relative frequency of Afrikaans surnames amongst English-speaking South Africans, and of non-Afrikaans surnames amongst Afrikaans-speakers, would assuredly prove the opposite. The northward moving frontier encouraged the assimilation of outsiders into the Afrikaner people. The English, Jewish or Scottish immigrant was not always able to find a wife of his own nationality or faith on the lonely veld of the 'Far North'. He then married an Afrikaans-speaking girl, and their children frequently adopted their mother's tongue. This phenomenon can certainly be traced in the early statistics of national intermarriage kept for Southern Rhodesia at the time when that territory could be considered as the northward extension of the South African frontier.

One of the weaknesses of her analysis of the present position is to be found in the inadequate treatment of the military and strategic factors that influence the South African situation. Her lack of interest in military affairs is shared by most other sociologists, but the omission becomes especially serious in a country like South Africa. As it is, too many of her observations are confined to pointing out that 'the Cadets were given Afrika Corps-style caps' by the Nationalists, and that the rank of Chief of the General Staff was replaced by that of Commandant-General (a title incidentally

which was also used at one time in the staunchly British Rhodesian Defence Force).

But the gravest objection lies in the author's approach as a whole. In her own words, she is attempting 'as objectively as may be' to trace the development from 'oppressed nationhood into oppressive nationalism'. The result of mixing value judgments and analysis is a moral-political sermon interspersed with a good deal of valuable sociological and historical information. In an analytical work 'the brood of Nationalist Frankensteins' on page 101, 'the young bulls of the Jeugbond and the Afrikaanse Studentebond' on page 103, as well as their 'English speaking stooges' on page 105, are out of place. They would be more at home in a Liberal Party pamphlet! The fundamental theme of the sermon is the steady growth of depravity of the Afrikaner nation, or at any rate of their leaders. Gone are the real or supposed good characteristics that distinguished the Afrikaners, when they were the favourite champions of British liberals against Tory Imperialism. 'Hospitableness and personal dignity are waning traditions. Self reliance has faded away under the pauperizing impact of relief schemes and sheltered labour policies' (page 293). Gone are 'the sturdily independent and even factious Voortrekkers'. Afrikaner culture, in the towns at any rate, has increasingly become 'An imposed set of abstractions evolved and propagated by a clique' (page 256) whose doings tend to be marked by 'uncompromising ruthlessness as to ends, combined with a flexible immorality as to means' (page 110).

Now this reviewer does not believe that a historian or a sociologist should make no value judgments. But a scholar should make them explicit. He should also make them on the basis of clearly defined theological or philosophical criteria. Finally he should attempt to keep his value judgments rigidly apart from objective analysis. If he does not follow this rule, he will not produce objective history or sociology. He will rather turn out 'the sort of objective history which would promote inter-racial understanding', advocated by the author (page 228), who does not apparently realize that objective history does not necessarily promote inter-racial understanding. (To mention only one instance, G. Reitlinger's grimly impersonal work *The Final Solution* . . ., though a fine piece of scholarship, is unlikely to serve the cause of improving German-Jewish 'race' relations.)

As it is, her book is not even a particularly good sermon. The Fundamentalist English missionary in nineteenth-century South Africa did better. He often saw in the Boers an ungodly people that was sent to scourge the righteous flock of his Black converts. His condemnation was expressed in terms of a clearly defined faith. But a brew of moral and supposedly scientific criteria, employed at the same time, is liable to lead to confusion.

This confusion often becomes very apparent when liberals tackle the burning problems of apartheid, white supremacy and other tenets

of the Nationalist Party. In Marquard's works, apartheid—'the White man's determination not to admit his colonial subjects to social, political or economic equality'—is seen as an attempt 'to apply nineteenth-century policies to twentieth-century conditions'. In other words it is an archaic one. Sheila Patterson goes further still. She stresses the irrational aspects of such policies 'which seem(s) to have much in common with Ralph Linton's account of magical forms of nativistic movements. . . .' White settler policies of the non-liberal type have their foundations in a 'refusal to accept reality, and a very low capacity for accommodation to the total situation' (p. 276).

These conclusions are not obvious. In refusing to be ruled by a non-European majority, a Nationalist, or indeed a member of the United Party, may be grossly selfish. He may possibly be ill-advised in the various policies which he advocates to prevent this fate. But he is not necessarily acting irrationally. After all, racial minorities *do* quite often have a tough time. In a passage dealing with the Afrikaans language that oddly conflicts with the tenor of the book as a whole, Sheila Patterson just touches on the subject. She writes that 'the survival of Afrikaans as a language is probably in the last analysis dependent upon the survival of the Afrikaners as a dominant national entity' (page 49). She may of course be wrong in this surmise. But similar thoughts have also suggested themselves to Afrikaners, for the fate of politically powerless minorities is rarely an easy one. The Afrikaner does not need a learned sociologist or a skilled psychoanalyst to tell him that. He knows it from his own history, which indeed possesses a greater continuity than the author allows.

A critique of South African liberalism

The South African, however liberal, rarely comes to grips with problems of this nature. Admittedly, generalizations are always difficult. Liberals include, and have included in the past, a number of people of widely different opinions and tempers. But all the same there is something like a liberal 'climate of opinion'. Certain arguments recur again and again in lecture rooms, in social gatherings of an 'advanced' character, in learned publications, and in newspapers, which have a kind of inner unity and merit further discussion. (This discussion will not include views based on theological foundations only, as these fall into a category of their own and the reviewer is ill-equipped to deal with them.)

The underlying philosophy of most South African liberals rests on certain assumptions which once found wide, though not universal, acceptance amongst nineteenth-century free traders in Great Britain. These views may be summarized roughly by postulating that there is a kind of necessary, underlying harmony, a sort of 'invisible hand' making for good. All conflicts are ultimately due to misconception of interest. Provided certain economic, social and poli-

tical institutions, founded in reason itself, can be enforced, and provided men can be made to realize their 'true' interests, universal happiness must result.

This view is commonly applied by South African liberals in what might be called the Anglo-centric fashion. South African liberals usually believe that South Africa can pass through a development similar to that of Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the country which is usually their intellectual home. The liberals think of the example of a country that successfully enfranchised first its industrial middle classes, and then its workers; and they believe that the same can be done in South Africa. The fact that the unskilled workers in South Africa mostly belong to a different ethnic group is irrelevant. The special characteristics of the African intelligentsia with their political ambitions are of no importance. Political and social emancipation is compatible with the maintenance of something like the present class structure in South Africa. Admittedly, the propertied and salaried classes will have to make some sacrifices. But they will still have their Morris Minors and their libraries, their tea parties and their suburban homes.¹ Fears of an ethnic minority status are quite unfounded. There are no true conflicts of interests. *Alles sal reg kom.* Britain is a sound model.

But nineteenth-century Britain, with its belief in the invisible hand of self-interest inevitably making for the greatest good of the greatest number, does not necessarily offer a parallel to the South African situation. Britain was a wealthy country and becoming richer all the time. It possessed a vigorous, long-established, and linguistically homogeneous bourgeoisie. Once the country's vast industrial investments had reached the producing stage, there was enough for shares all round without a *violent* overthrow of the social system. At the same time Britain was developing one of the most productive agricultural systems known to history, without meeting serious opposition from the rural proletariat. Nineteenth-century reform, though liberals tend to neglect this aspect of British history, was also closely associated with the creation of a highly trained and efficient police force, which turned the country from one of the worst-policed to one of the safest in Europe.

As far as the outside world was concerned, Britain was protected by an invincible navy. The ordinary citizen might never see the great iron-clads that defended his country, but he correctly believed that Britain was safe from attack. Not only Kipling, but also John Bright and the Webbs were the children of the age of the two- or three-power standard. It was indeed this unconscious acceptance of British naval supremacy, which made British 'progressives' so indifferent to those vital questions of military strategy and organization that exercised many minds abroad.

Linked to this feeling of security was a widespread belief in the beneficence of social and constitutional change abroad. Foreign revolutions somehow had an air of glamour. The reason for this

may be explained partly in idealistic and partly in economic terms. Many of the newly independent nations that came into being in the course of the nineteenth century were at first prepared to pursue policies designed to remove some of the existing barriers to trade. Initially these new states normally lacked strong industrial pressure groups of their own; they veered towards freer trade, and the British attitude was thus usually favourable towards their national independence. In addition, some of the older monarchies were guilty of very unsound financial policies. To mention one example, newly independent Greece, torn and poverty stricken as she was, from the economic point of view, became preferable to a state like Turkey, which in the 'seventies repudiated its foreign debts and aroused the wrath of such Liberals as Gladstone, not only for her cruelties towards Christians, but also for her rapacity towards foreign investors.

Finally, military factors played their part. A nineteenth-century army was not as complex a machine as a twentieth-century force. Field guns and muskets, later rifles, spades and barbed wire, could be acquired fairly easily, even by a small peasant-country, and they did not require vast numbers of highly trained technicians to service them. Transport and staff problems were easier. One Serbian or Bulgarian division was therefore roughly the military equivalent of one French or Austrian one. A coalition of several smaller states could fight a first-class power with some hope of success. The newly independent states possessed some means of self defence, independent of support from outside, and the support given by British 'progressives' to nationalists abroad made some military sense.

'Progressive' policies abroad moreover did not interfere with safety at home. From about the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the dominant strata in Britain felt safe against revolution at home. The country differed from many others in being ethnically largely a homogeneous one. Outside Ireland, which never fitted the British pattern, there were no serious minority problems. Neither did national and class division ever widely coincide outside the subject island. Movements of social protest were thus not re-enforced by national or cultural demands. The result was a general feeling of sympathy for 'progressive' movements abroad, a feeling linked to the widespread conviction that it was a comparatively easy matter to implant British liberal institutions elsewhere.

South African liberals have taken over this general framework of ideas. But they completely failed to see that the experiences of a nationally homogeneous country, such as Britain, is of little relevance to South Africa. South African liberals should therefore interest themselves rather in the history of states with national minority problems. In doing so, they will admittedly find a few regions where different linguistic groups have been able to live together in one state on terms of equality and friendship, while at

the same time successfully having a liberal Parliamentary regime. Switzerland is the example that springs to mind immediately. But certain well-defined conditions appear to have been necessary for the creation of a multi-national state devoid of internal tension. Class divisions must never have coincided with ethnic divisions to any marked extent. The way of life of the various national groups must not be greatly different in character. The country must have attained its unity before the age of nationalism and compulsory education, before the creation of great bureaucratic machines with their diploma'd, degree'd and security-vetted office holders, who in multi-national societies have so often learned how to use their national affiliation as a means of economic advancement.

But more common than the societies described above were those in which class and ethnic divisions tended to coincide. In many areas of Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the towns used to be culturally different from the countryside, and the landowners, the burghers and the peasants spoke different languages from one another. In those regions, the age of nationalism meant that a peasant-bred intelligentsia was coming into its own, which commonly tended to form the nucleus of the new nation states. The peasant, who had made good in a town, gradually ceased to wish for assimilation into the immigrant group that had once dominated the town economically. The Slav immigrant who, for example, had settled in Ragusa on the Adriatic coast, was after some time no longer willing to become an Italian. He became conscious of his own nationality, which he now began to use as a weapon in the struggle for economic advancement.

The standard-bearers of revolution were the peasant-bred intellectuals. (These were themselves often led at first by lawyers. For the lawyers were those who were best acquainted with their masters' legislative instruments and the weaknesses in the legislative structure. They were also trained how to speak in public and, even for professional reasons alone, they were anxious to make a name for themselves in public life.) The intellectuals as a mass were usually the more irreconcilable advocates of fundamental change. Their best means of economic advancement normally was to be found in promotion within the bureaucracy. Sooner or later they found that they had to gain control of the state machinery to gain advancement, and this meant gaining control of the state as a whole by means of a national revolution.

National revolutions were often accompanied by social revolutions. Social revolutions in their turn often took on a nationalist colouring. The national-revolutionary demands tended to follow a certain pattern which we now see being repeated in certain parts of Africa. There was the demand for 'land-reform', irrespective of its economic merits. There was the cry for 'adequate' representation of the new *Staatsvolk* in the public services, in business and the professions at the expense of the previously favoured

minority groups. National considerations began to outweigh those of efficiency, when jobs were being shared out,² and a complex science developed of how to squeeze out the alien by means of state corporations, the *numerus clausus* as applied in various economic spheres, consumers' boycotts and other means of economic persecution.

At the same time there developed an emotionally highly charged intellectual climate, one that was favourable to radical solutions but one that was as opposed to the rationalist spirit of liberalism. All the new nations quickly revived or manufactured 'ancient' traditions which, so to speak, formed part of their military equipment. These revived 'national traditions' tended to display similar characteristics and would repay sociological investigation. There was generally the 'ancient empire' myth. The medieval state of Stephan Dushan might have no more to do with modern Serbia than ancient Ghana has to do with the Gold Coast. No matter, ancient glory and the grim lays of old made a good war-cry. Then there was the myth of the *terra irredenta*. The frontiers of the ancient empire had to be re-established, and the enslaved brethren had to be liberated. Territorial expansion at the same time would expand the taxable capacity of the new state and provide its intellectuals with additional government posts. In addition there was the explosive belief of redemption through suffering. The new nations might not have the technical skill or the literary traditions of 'older' peoples. They generally also lacked the 'frontier' mystique of certain young settler countries overseas. But they often believed themselves to be possessed of something infinitely more precious, a great humanity, a deeper folk-soul, and more profound feelings than their neighbours. These had supposedly been born from the real or imagined miseries and injustices of the past. Thus most Eastern European nations considered that at one time or another they had heroically saved Western Europe by sacrificing themselves in the struggle against Turks, Tartars or other undesirable Asians!

Similar ideologies are now coming into existence in Africa, where their popularity seems likely to spread. One of these is the belief in the virtues of *négritude*, and the emphasis on the sacrificial role of the African slave in the making of modern European civilization.

A mystique of suffering is, however, a dangerous thing. It helps to make for more suffering. A nation that has suffered so bitterly in the past now often feels itself entitled to make alien villeins suffer in the present.

For these and other reasons the new nations have therefore tended to be intolerant of their minorities. National-social transformations have even led to the physical elimination of minorities, especially those who happened to be too wealthy. The Jews, Anatolian Greeks and Armenians fell under this category. It might be added

hat the persecution of minorities did not necessarily end under Marxist regime where class, not race, became the officially sanctioned standard of persecution. The number of minorities expelled from Communist countries has been considerable. They have included the Germans of East Prussia and Bohemia, the Japanese in Sakhalin, the Magyars in Slovakia, the Bulgarians of Turk origin, and many others. The strength of the Communist state machine in fact merely facilitated a task that many 'bourgeois nationalists' would often themselves have liked to carry out, had they been in a position to do so.³

Whatever the regime, national minorities in 'multi-racial' societies can thus expect rough treatment when subject to a nationally distinct majority. This will be especially true if the minorities appear to be possessed of more than their fair share of economic wealth; then they are liable to be liquidated altogether.

This generalization is likely to remain as true of South Africa as it is of other countries. It would of course be ridiculous to suppose that, say, a Nationalist farmer has consciously reasoned this out before going to the polls. His views on the native question are not the result of a rationalist enquiry into minority problems, but of his upbringing and general cultural background.

But the results of a sociological investigation, based on historical experiences, might very well bear out some of his unformulated beliefs and fears. It might even be argued that the Afrikaners, born of Africa and for long one of the world's 'unhistorical' nations, have a better instinctive understanding of the explosive potentialities of an unchained African nationalism than a British, or a British-trained, liberal. The national existence of the Afrikaners is, moreover, entirely bound up with Africa. Understandably, they are especially perturbed as regards the chances of survival, even in politically stable countries, of a small minority devoid of political power.

The fears of South African Nationalists, or even those of white settlers in other parts of Africa, are not in the least likely to be set at rest by nebulous projects of minority protection, of international guarantees, of international police forces which have sometimes been suggested. These schemes are not new. An internationally controlled gendarmerie was, for example, stationed for some time in disturbed Macedonia before the outbreak of the First World War. Many solemn international guarantees were, for instance, given to various Eastern European minorities. But none of these projects succeeded. None of them is ever likely to do so. They will remain nothing but bogus applications of the trusteeship principle to the international sphere, as long as they remain devoid of the realities of permanent administrative and police power. No faith need be placed in them.

Self-defence is likely to require measures of a different kind. The Nationalist formula is that of *apartheid*, linked to a belief in the

need for permanent white supremacy. Liberals hold strongly that these measures, apart from their moral content, are quite unsuitable for the purposes for which they have been designed, purposes of social and national self-preservation. The liberal may of course be right, but some of his contentions remain to be proved. Horizontal segregation of skills and, at least partial residential segregation in space, may well confer some considerable strategic advantages to the dominant group if carried out with an eye to military rather than to purely emotional reasons. Such a policy is quite compatible with extensive social welfare schemes organized from above, and even with limited autonomy for the subordinate groups in selected regions. Whatever one may think of such a policy, it is at any rate very different from one of all-out repression and massacre in the Teutonic style or the massive 'population exchanges' that some of the so-called 'progressive' nations have carried out.

Admittedly, the segregational measures in South Africa have to be paid for, just like any other kind of armaments. Liberals who still live in the mental atmosphere of the great free trade period of Great Britain believe that the costs of such a policy would be too high. The imposition of barriers on the free mobility of labour is believed to impose an unbearable burden on the Union by strangling its economic development and thereby reducing even its military potential. Conflicting views may of course be held with regard to the economic and social policies of the Nationalist government. But the experiences of modern single-party states does not, however, necessarily bear out the view that industrialization cannot occur without a fluid labour force having unfettered spatial and social mobility. In the nineteenth century individual liberty and industrialization went together. But the two do not always coincide.

The more sophisticated South African liberals sometimes use another argument, which, in attenuated language, appears to have been drawn from the armoury of Marxist thought.

All the economically superior groups should seek an alliance against the unskilled proletariat in their own interest. Some also hold that this *union sacrée* of the civilized should be accompanied by the creation of a common, inter-racial patriotism that will easily and naturally supplant national or ethnic loyalties.

It is of course not impossible that such an alliance could come into being in certain regions under certain circumstances. Conceivably, under a bold and brilliant leadership, it may succeed. Again, the creation of supra-national loyalties has not been unknown to history.

But the experiences of other multi-national societies are not always encouraging; and it will need more than an all-out liberal programme and good intentions to put such a solution into practice. The middle classes will not hang together easily because they themselves are torn by economic conflict which may easily express itself in national form.

To mention only one example, the various national bourgeoisies of Czechoslovakia entirely failed to act in this rationalistic fashion. Though not divided by colour differences or colour bars, but only by national differences, they did not unite against their workers. Nor did their workers commonly unite against them. Above all the Germans and Czechs, despite occasional co-operation, fought one another in a national struggle that cut across class differences. Each middle class group called on its own national proletariat to support it in the struggle for control of the state. The struggle continued, embittered by foreign intervention, till one of the contending nationalities was eliminated under Communist auspices, and the middle classes disappeared altogether.⁴

A further pseudo-realist argument is based on the inevitability of outside intervention. The White man, it is argued, is everywhere in retreat. Asia has thrown off the shackles of colonialism and the few nations of the world will not tolerate a colour-regime in one little corner of the world. Unless white South Africans reform themselves, others will do it for them.

This argument is one that transfers the liberal belief in the inevitability of progress into the realm of foreign policies. Its reference to the importance of ideological appeals is admittedly a valid one. But states are more than the embodiments of ideologies. They are also organizations directed towards the pursuit of military and political power. As such, they tend to be ruled by strategic and economic considerations more than by ideological ones. This truth applies to old and new countries alike. Ideologically, the empires of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs were more alike than any other two states in pre-1914 Europe. But they clashed for political and strategic reasons.

The new Asian nations are guided by similar considerations, though these are of course not the only ones. The liberal does not always realize this. All too often he tends to think of the newly independent or nearly independent countries as a kind of 'economic man', anxious to buy his ideologies and investment goods in the cheapest market, and to sell his services on the dearest. But in adopting this point of view, the liberal is not really paying these new nations a compliment. Their motives are likely to be more realistic. As long as Turkey believes that the Dardanelles are threatened, she will side with the West, no matter what the attitude of London landladies may be towards Turkish students! As long as India believes that she can maintain her neutrality, she will do so, whatever the attitude of South Africans is towards their Indian minority. Similar considerations apply when the new nations intervene in regions beyond their sway. Thus in backing the Arab coalition against Israel, India may or may not have been justified. But whatever her reasons for this policy, they were not primarily of an ideological kind. Had they been so, she would presumably have supported Israel with its neutralist and socialistic beliefs.

Strategy and economics will continue to dominate foreign policy. But from the strategic point of view it is not likely that South Africa will ever be called upon to face a world-wide coalition. Her strategic and economic position is a vital one, and too many powers have strong military reasons for wishing for her survival, however much they dislike her social structure.

In the face of this evidence, the liberal then resorts to the inevitability-of-revolution argument. The demands of the subordinate groups must be met. If they are not, the alternative is bound to be revolution. The longer reform is delayed, the more certain the revolution will become and the more violent will it be in character. A timely surrender is therefore in the best interests of the ruling strata themselves. But the mechanics of revolution are not those of a defective pressure-cooker! Revolutions need some very well defined conditions for their success. Long before the first shot is fired, the revolutionaries must have succeeded in occupying important positions of vantage within the state. In addition, the existing state administration and its fighting forces must have been fatally weakened, either by decay from within, or by military defeat from without. These conditions, however, do not often exist, and many revolutions do not succeed. The belief that 'in the end' they always do is another of the unformulated tenets of liberal belief that merits further discussion. It would appear to derive from the myth of the *levée en masse* which has found currency ever since the days of the French Revolution. Virtuous peoples rightly struggling to be free are always bound to overthrow their tyrants in the long run. The revolutionaries, being more progressive, invent more advanced forms of tactics and military organization, such as the column tactics and military organization used by the French Revolutionary armies. They alone can mobilize the masses. Hence they are bound to win. But this view ignores the military contributions which the *ancien régime* made to the revolutionary achievements in the fields of tactics, strategy and organization. It also ignores the proven ability of many conservative regimes to adjust themselves to military change. It also fails to keep in mind the many national and social revolutions that have failed. The Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Catalonians and the Basques never had a successful national revolution and probably never will. The Germans never had a successful social revolution, able to seize political power, without the help derived from military defeat abroad. The example of Hungary has shown the impossibility of a successful military rising in a Soviet-dominated country.

As far as South Africa is concerned, there is no reason why the existing social order should not continue indefinitely, provided the dominant groups retain their cohesion, self-confidence and military skill. The strategic outlook for an insurrectionary movement, whether based in the towns or in the country, is poor. Urban revolutionary conspiracy does not flourish in segregated quarters

where movement is impeded by pass laws, and organization impeded by police raids. More important still, no urban movement can develop without the support of the skilled workers and of at least some of the managerial elements. The chances of an insurrection in the country are even poorer. South Africa does not possess those dense jungles, forest and swamp lands and snow-covered peaks, that alone provide the essential topographical conditions for starting rural partisan warfare. In addition, the only armed sections of the population to be found in the country are as loyal to the state as the army and the police are as a whole.

Neither is there any evidence that passive resistance has ever succeeded against a determined and resolute opponent not already half-convinced of the rightness of the rebels' claims. For sooner or later, passive resistance must pass into active opposition, or it will collapse as the result of loss of confidence amongst the resisters.

Whilst resistance through violence or non-co-operation is therefore impossible, there are, however, some reasons for the belief that success might be achieved by tactics of infiltration. Each act of partial political democratization, once conceded, might without proper safeguards conceivably be followed by further demands whose tempo would accelerate with growing success.

Judicious concessions of course succeed sometimes. Much depends on scope and timing. But there is no evidence that concessions alone will necessarily succeed from the ruler's point of view. It is almost axiomatic of the struggles of the 'non-historic nations' that each demand becomes obsolete as soon as it has been met. For the real objective is not the composition of the village council at Cluj in Ruritania. It is control of the Ruritanian state machinery. It is moreover commonly taken for granted by the revolutionary that any concession granted by the dominant group has its origin in sordid motives or in fear. A small concession is thus often looked upon as 'a hypocritical gesture to bamboozle world opinion', whilst a major concession becomes 'a crushing defeat inflicted upon the tyrant by the toiling masses'.

Indeed from the psychological point of view, it is conceivable that the straightforward military conqueror of the Windschigrätz type may at times even prove to be more acceptable to the peasant-bred intellectual of the 'non-historic' nationalities, than the well-intentioned reformer anxious to practise a policy of cultural assimilation. The man with the bayonet at least pays the revolutionary the compliment of being sufficiently afraid of him to go about armed. But the reformer who combines a policy of concessions with one of cultural assimilation may become suspected of despising at heart the traditions of the subject-people. It is sometimes less wounding to a man that he is thought to be potentially dangerous than to be told that he, or his parents, are barbarians who must be assimilated to a superior culture before becoming acceptable. Whatever truth there may be in this more speculative passage, it does seem certain

that the demands of the 'non-historic' nations are likely to increase, following a well-defined pattern. Ultimately the non-historic nations will find, as Sheila Patterson says of the Afrikaners, that it is 'not enough to win the struggle on the language and political fronts, so long as economic power remains in alien hands'. Claims for 'economic democracy' are, however, very likely to do away with the 'civilized' or 'White' standard of living of a minority, as long as the economic potentials of the region remains insufficiently developed.⁵ The erstwhile rulers, having relinquished their defences, might conceivably be forced into making more and more concessions till their economic or even their physical elimination has been accomplished.

In such a context, economic decline would be probable, since the revolutionaries would lack much of the economic and administrative skill that is essential for development. At the same time, the breakdown of that liberal democratic structure, so highly desired by liberals, would appear to be certain. For democracy of Western European type rarely flourishes in plural societies. Such societies tend to be run most successfully by means that are not fully democratic in the Western sense. The forms of such rule may vary, but one thing is certain. A revolutionary regime is unlikely in the long run to be anything but dictatorial. Such a regime can of course easily enough use the language of European Liberalism, but its imported liberal phraseology then itself becomes a weapon of war. Such a regime will find it impossible to implant the spirit of liberal institutions into an alien soil.⁶

If there is any truth in this analysis there would appear to be only three attitudes of mind which a South African liberal may adopt.

He may argue that there are no 'lessons of history'. All historical events are unique. The experiences of other plural societies are therefore of no interest to South Africans. What has happened elsewhere does therefore not have to happen in South Africa. This point of view is philosophically a perfectly defensible one. But if it is correct, Marquard's and his fellow liberals' comparative material is irrelevant. Sociologists, at the same time, would have to content themselves with work of a purely descriptive nature, a conclusion which most of them would probably find unpalatable.

Alternatively, the liberal may argue that whilst lessons can indeed be learnt from experiences elsewhere, the lessons from abroad are not applicable to South Africa. He may show that the social forces at work in South Africa are totally different from those at work elsewhere. This point of view would require a thorough analysis, showing how and why the fate of a powerless white minority in South Africa would be different from that of similarly placed minorities elsewhere.

Finally there is the problem of the moral choice. The liberal may agree that the experience of other minorities are of value, but they do not matter. Let liberty prevail, and let no man count the

social cost. Spiritual riches are better than material ones, freedom is worth more than a temporary civilization. *Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.*

Such an attitude may inspire moral respect, provided the advocate of such views is really willing that the heavens should fall, and that they should fall on himself rather than others.

But even such a man will find himself in a moral quandary. A Serbian lay records how on the eve of the disastrous battle of Kosovo an angel appeared to the Serbian Tsar. 'Will you have an earthly kingdom or a heavenly kingdom?' he asked. The Tsar chose the eternal kingdom. On the next day the battle was fought and the Serbs were slaughtered. The Serbs gained salvation and the Turks the bulk of their realm.

But the bard did not make the point that the Tsar's choice did not involve only himself, but also the fate of his kinsmen and followers; and so does the choice of the South African liberal dealist. But the idealist is unable to see the problem in these terms. Even if he should do so, he does not make his difficulty public. Reformers have accordingly shown themselves somewhat chary of presenting the angel's choice to a white electorate.

But none of these manifold problems are even so much as hinted at in most liberal publications dealing with Southern Africa. Their moral is usually a simple one. The Promised Land is ahead. There shall be fraternity without tears. The days of oppression shall be past—if only a few wicked or irrational men would learn a few simple lessons! And there the reviewer can only conclude: *redat Judaeus Appella!*

Notes to the Text

¹ 'For the nobles, high prelates and ladies, philosophy and sociology were an innocent pastime; they played at revolution. "'Liberty'", the Comte de Segur wrote later, "delighted us by its daring, and 'equality' by its agreeableness. It is always pleasant to descend when one knows one can rise again at will. Unthinking as we were, we enjoyed the advantages of patrician life and delights of a plebeian philosophy at one and the same time."

"And although our own privileges and the remains of our former power were being undermined beneath our feet, we were not alarmed, because as yet we did not feel the impact of the blows directed at us. We never dreamed that this wordy warfare might threaten the exalted life that was ours."—G. Salvemini, *The French Revolution 1788–1792*, J. Cape, London, new. ed. (1954).

² 'Dr. Khouw Bian Tie of the Central Bank of Indonesia expressed the matter very succinctly from the point of view of a new Staatsvolk face to face with economically powerful ethnic minorities: "It is self-evident that a politically overbearing state also wishes to extend this sovereignty to economic life. Consequently every national Government, wherever on the globe, will strive after increasing the share in the economic activity of its own nationals. An obstacle or a thorn in the flesh is, politically speaking, formed by the command of economic strategic points by non-nationals."—*The Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries*, Records of the 29th Session held in London from 13–16th December 1955, International Institute of Differing Civilization, Brussels (1956), page 307.

³ A good example of a multi-racial state that failed to succeed was Czechoslovakia. There were no Czechoslovakians! See for instance, A. J. P. Taylor's remarks on the Czechoslovak problem in his brilliant analysis of the Habsburg Monarchy. 'The Presidency of Masaryk served to answer the great "if only" of Habsburg history: if only the Habsburgs had been more far-sighted and democratic. Czechs and Germans were not reconciled: instead it became finally clear that the two could not live together within the boundaries of the same state.'

—*The Habsburg Monarchy*, Hamish Hamilton, London (1948), page 254.

The Czech point of view in the end was comparable with that of the Kenya student quoted by A. T. Carey who considered that 'white settlers, because of their attitude towards the Africans, have lost their right to be citizens of the country. They should be evacuated once independence has been attained.'—*Colonial Students: A Study of the Social Adaptation of Colonial Students in London*, Secker and Warburg, London (1956), page 235.

⁴ The alliance between middle-class Malays and Chinese in Malaya would appear to have been an unusual case. Malaya differed from the remainder of much of South-East Asia in that the conflicting ethnic groups were fairly equally balanced. British rule for some time managed to hold the balance between them, especially when the threat of a Communist victory was more imminent. There was moreover in Malaya an unusually high degree of economic development compared with the remainder of the area. Nevertheless, F. G. Carnell, an expert on the area, is convinced that even in Malaya 'there is also a growing feeling amongst the Malays that they cannot enter business without restricting the activities of other ethnic groups'.—*The Development of a Middle Class . . .*, *op. cit.*, article by F. G. Carnell, p. 277.

Similar sentiments against unduly wealthy aliens have been expressed by members of the African National Congress against Indian shop-keepers in Nyasaland, and by African West Coast nationalists against Lebanese traders. In the French Ivory Coast, where many leading positions were originally held by Africans from other West Coast territories which had developed more quickly, this state of affairs led to bitter resentment against the Black immigrants on the part of the new indigenous Ivory Coast intelligentsia, and to severe social tensions.

⁵ It has been authoritatively argued in British Liberal journals that the West Indies might well provide an alternative pattern for a multi-racial Africa. It has thus been suggested that property might well remain in the hands of the original owners, whilst political power would pass into the hands of the black majority. It is of course impossible to look into the future. But nevertheless, the argument under-estimates the degree to which economic and social power tend to be interdependent. This argument also overlooks the very different historical background of the two areas. In the West Indies, as in Brazil, there was slavery, followed by miscegenation and complete linguistic assimilation. The tribal organization and languages of the African immigrants were shattered in the process of forcible transplantation, and no potential sense of belonging to a separate African *nationality* could come into being. This did not apply to the Bantu-speaking peoples of Africa itself.

⁶ Speaking of the countries of South East Asia, Carnell argues: 'Owing to the lack of homogeneity of culture and the absence of a numerous middle class, the prospects for a parliamentary democracy in all three countries, Burma, Thailand, Malay, are bleak. State planning, the authoritarian tradition, and the fact that the indigenous middle class is, in each case, mainly a bureaucracy, all make for authoritarian political structures'.—*The Development of a Middle Class . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 278. The African parallel is obvious.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

A Review Article

by

I. M. LEWIS

Tribes Without Rulers, Studies in African Segmentary Systems. Edited by JOHN MIDDLETON and DAVID TAIT, with a preface by E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD. Routledge and Kegan Paul (London), 1958. Pp. xi + 234. 28s.

I

AN appreciation of *Tribes Without Rulers* provides a convenient occasion for a brief consideration of some wider problems of the classification of African political systems in the light of recent writing on the subject, of which a bibliography is given at the end of this article. For instance, the most recent conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute included contributions on the classification of Central African and other political systems (consult Apthorpe (ed.), 1959).

Since the publication in 1940 of Professor Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer*, and his and Professor Fortes' collation, *African Political Systems*, in the same year, the question of establishing a useful and valid typology of tribal political structures has received considerable attention. It will be recalled that the editors of *African Political Systems* proposed the recognition of three types of system. The first consisted of those 'very small societies . . . in which even the largest political unit embraces a group of people all of whom are united to one another by ties of kinship, so that political relations are coterminous with kinship relations and the political structure and kinship organization are completely fused'. No societies of this type are discussed in *African Political Systems* but the editors apparently had in mind polities such as those of the Bushmen (see Schapera, 1956).

Secondly, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard distinguished those societies without centralized government where a lineage structure is the framework of the political system and where there is a precise co-ordination between the two. These were exemplified by the Logoli, Tallensi and Nuer. Finally, societies possessing an administrative organization as the framework of their political structure were regarded as forming a third category. The examples given of this

class were the Zulu, Bemba, Ngwato, Banyankole, and the Kede. It is clear that when they wrote of such societies as possessing 'an administrative organization' Fortes and Evans-Pritchard meant that they had a centralized hierarchical political structure—a government as distinct from merely government—and that they were states rather than stateless societies such as the Nuer and Tallensi.

It has of course been recognized for some time that not all stateless tribal polities without centralized government fall into the same class as the Nuer and Tallensi where a lineage organization is the basis of the political system. Attention has been drawn to such systems of government as those of the Ibo and Yako where the political system is founded on 'authoritative associations' and kinship groups (Brown, 1951), and to the situation amongst many of the Nilo-Hamites where political functions are vested in an age-set system (Benardi, 1952; Eisenstadt, 1954).

Thus the morphological range of tribal political organization in Africa alone is wide and it is not easy to devise a system of classification which satisfactorily accommodates all types of tribal polity. But in any preliminary classification it seems essential to adopt a common gauge and to place on a linear scale tribal polities according to some common basis of comparison. The simplest classification turns on Evans-Pritchard's and Fortes' dichotomy between statelike and stateless political structures. Thus in a recent classificatory essay by Eisenstadt (1959) the starting-point of analysis is 'the extent of articulation of special political positions and organizations', a statement which becomes clear when it is seen to entail the same two polar extremes proposed by the editors of *African Political Systems*. Thus, as Eisenstadt puts it, there are first 'tribes which seemingly have no specially organized, central political authority or organization; where political activity takes place within the subgroups of society and through their interaction'. Secondly there are those 'tribes among which central political authority and organization undoubtedly exist'.

II

While recognizing the value of contributions such as the recent essay by Eisenstadt which concentrate upon distinctions according to functional criteria of different variants within each of these polar types, it seems also important to regard them as extremes on a wider continuum. Thus if the criterion of classification is the degree to which a particular political system possesses centralized and formal government and a hierarchy of administrative offices, there seem to be at least four main categories falling at different points upon a common scale. These run from unitary centralized states at one extreme through 'segmentary states' such as the Alur described by Southall (*n.d.*) where there is only a weak central authority without an absolute monopoly in the use of force, through

tribal polities which are not states but which nevertheless have something of a politico-administrative hierarchy—such as the Shona and indeed most of the Central African peoples (with the exceptions of the Lozi, Bemba, Lunda and Ngoni), these being states with a wide degree of organized central government, to the final extreme of fully uncentralized societies.

Such a linear typology might be represented as follows:

TYPES OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT

A. States.	B. Segmentary States.	C. Tribal polities with some degree of hierarchy.	D. Completely stateless societies.
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It will be noticed that in this scheme the difference between tribal structures, particularly of class C and of class B, is one of degree and scale. Within the sequence ABC it is easy to see a logical development in which small modifications in the degree of centralization and development of hierarchy could lead to transitions from type C to type A. Thus a people divided into a number of petty chiefdoms, each in turn composed of villages under headmen, can become a segmentary state when one chiefdom assumes paramountcy and exercises a degree of administrative control over the others. From existing previously as autonomous political units, the constituent chiefdoms lose some of their political exclusiveness to a central administering authority charged with making external policy decisions. When the central government obtains a complete monopoly in the maintenance of law and order and in controlling external policy, the transition is complete. But the gap between structures of type C and D remains wide.

Clearly within each class there is a wide range of possible political and governmental principles. This has been stressed by Eisenstadt at both ends of the scale: and since *Tribes Without Rulers* is concerned with societies which fall under category D it is convenient to tabulate here some variants of it which it seems to be generally agreed should be distinguished.

SOME TYPES OF STATELESS GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE¹

- a. Segmentary lineage organizations in which the political structure is congruent with a segmentary system of corporate descent groups.

¹ Eisenstadt (1959) recognizes six sub-classes at this end of the scale within what he calls 'Segmentary Tribes'. These are (1) 'Band Organization', exemplified by the Australian and Pygmy tribes, the Plateau Tonga and others; (2) 'Classical Segmentary Tribes', the Nuer, Kavirondo, and Tallensi lineage societies; (3) 'Universalistic (Age-Groups) Segmentary Tribes', Nandi and Masai, etc.; (4) 'Associational Tribes', Hopi, Zuni, Kiowa and other Plains Indian societies; (5) 'Ritually Stratified Tribes', the Anuak, Shilluk, and Ankole; and (6) 'Acephalous, Autonomous Villages', the Yako, Ibo, Ibibio, and some Yoruba.

- b. Societies in which political relations depend upon an age-set system such as that of the Masai (Fosbrooke 1948) and the Nandi (Huntingford, 1953, *a* and *b*).
- c. Tribal communities where political authority is vested in associations and village councils as e.g. the Yako (Forde, 1939) and the Ibo (Forde and Jones, 1950).
- d. Small-scale societies where the political units are essentially groups of kinsmen or extended families as e.g. the Bergdama and Bushmen.

It is not maintained, indeed it is most unlikely, that all known forms of African tribal political organization can be accommodated within this scheme. Where for example do the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, classified by Eisenstadt with the Australian and Pygmy tribes, or the Turkana and Jie, fall in? It might seem at first sight that the latter lie with the Masai and Nandi as Nilo-Hamites whose political system depends very largely upon an age-set organization. But from Gulliver's account (Gulliver 1955) it seems that this is an over-simplification. It would appear that the Turkana and Jie share with the Plateau Tonga what is often called a 'network' structure where there is a web of affiliations, more or less expressly political in nature, but where the political structure is not vested in any single structure. To suggest this is, of course, to raise the basis of comparison to a higher level of abstraction. For it implies—as is clearly true—that some societies are more structured than others, and that where in one tribal community political relations are identified with a clear-cut, almost monolithic, system of grouping, in others they depend upon a complex web of cross-cutting ties where people are associated at least quasi-politically through a variety of social relationships. The Nuer, for example, may have no formal central government but they have a very clearly defined territorial and lineage organization of a political character. The segments of society are grouped and also divided according to two well-defined principles which are themselves connected or at least congruent. Here there seem to be few strands in the web of government. This is not so with the Plateau Tonga, or apparently with the Turkana and Jie, and it is presumably partly for these reasons that in her analysis of Tonga social structure Dr. Colson speaks of social control rather than of political organization (Colson, 1953).

I mention these two cases because they suggest that it may be necessary to widen the dimensions of comparison in the classification of tribal government.

III

In the previous brief discussion of those tribal systems of government which fall at the stateless end of the scale I have deliberately avoided the term 'segmentary society' which is used by Eisenstadt and others as a portmanteau expression to embrace all systems

within this class—not merely those based on descent groups and described by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes as ‘segmentary lineage societies’. I have done this because it is misleading to label all uncentralized societies as ‘segmentary’. Evans-Pritchard dwelt on the segmentary character of Nuer political units, their tendency to fragment and yet also to unite in opposition to others (see *African Political Systems*, p. 284). And Smith (1956) has recently emphasized that politics are essentially segmentary in character irrespective of the structural form which they assume in any society. Gluckman (1954; 1955) has also stressed this aspect of political relations as a general characteristic and pointed to the integration which is achieved by the very fact of cleavage. People are linked in various ways and at various levels; and while they are drawn apart by differences in one relationship, they may be held together by unity in another. Moreover, in the widest sense all societies are segmentary, in as much as they consist of parts which are sometimes united and at other times divided. What therefore is significant is not segmentation in itself, but the way in which it is defined. In other words, our concern in the comparative study of government is to discover what particular organizations and institutions are activated by a segmentary political principle.

IV

The subject of Middleton and Tait’s book, *Tribes Without Rulers*, to which I may now turn, falls within the field of segmentary lineage societies (with some qualifications which I make later). This is an excellent collection of six essays prefaced by a stimulating introduction which discusses forms of African tribal government, and particularly the special features of segmentary lineage organization. The systems described as of segmentary lineage type are those of the Tiv (Dr. L. Bohannan) and Konkomba (Dr. Tait) of West Africa; the Mandari (Dr. Buxton) and the Western Dinka (Dr. G. Lienhardt) of the Sudan; and the Bwamba (Dr. Winter) and Lugbara (Dr. Middleton) of East Africa.

Before discussing these essays (or some of them) and the attempt made by the editors to classify their particular lineage characteristics, it is necessary to consider briefly the defining features of a segmentary lineage system. We start with the concept of lineage. A lineage consists of a corporate group of kinsmen who trace descent unilineally in truth or fictitiously to a common ancestor. A lineage is a single group—a corporation, or to be more exact in Maine’s terminology a ‘Corporation Aggregate’. (For an interesting application of Maine’s distinction between ‘Corporations Aggregate’ and ‘Corporations Sole’ in relation to lineage theory and tribal political structure, see Smith, 1956, pp. 60–70.) Rights and duties are vested in a lineage as in a single unit. But lineages are usually segmented into a greater or smaller number of component segments

and are thus segmentary corporations. Morphologically, the points of segmentation are the ancestors (or, in a matrilineal society, ancestresses) through whom descent is traced and whose names provide the points of articulation in the system. At the same time, in a polygynous patrilineal society differentiation of ancestors—and of lineages—by reference to uterine affiliation (what Fortes 1953:33, calls 'complementary filiation') is also important. But segmentation through uterine cleavages between siblings is not always clear in descriptions of lineage societies. It is certainly not clear in all the accounts marshalled together in *Tribes Without Rulers*.

Thus a segmentary lineage system is a system of corporate affiliation based upon a genealogical tree where the historical or quasi-historical content of the genealogy is less relevant than the fact that it represents the division of society into corporate groups of kin. In their introduction, Middleton and Tait rightly stress that corporate descent groups, or lineages, occur in many different tribal societies, and do not perform the same functions in all. As they point out, corporate grouping by descent may merely be recognized in the entailment and holding of property rights, or of status, without direct political significance. But in societies such as the Nuer and Tallensi, to which the term segmentary lineage system was first applied, the genealogical organization of society has both jural and political significance. And it is in this sense that the six societies described in *Tribes Without Rulers* are held to fall within this class.

Here, as with the Nuer and Tallensi and other segmentary lineage societies, political relations—the relations between groups competing for power—are mediated through a lineage system in which in principle each descent group is defined by its opposition to another like unit. Since politics are cast in an all-pervasive genealogical idiom, lineages which spring from the sons of a common ancestor (or in a matrilineal society the daughters of a common ancestress) are opposed and formally equivalent. Moreover, lineages at one level of segmentation unite against others at another level of division which, following Barnes (1954), Middleton and Tait refer to as the 'nesting' attribute. As Middleton and Tait say (p. 7) 'co-ordinate segments which have come into existence as a result of historical segmentation are regarded as complementary and as formally equal, even if in actuality they are not so in population, wealth, or in other ways. If political power and authority are vested in the structure, then its constituent units are politically equal.'

This raises a problem which is not I think sufficiently emphasized here although it has been examined in some other studies. In societies where strength is all important, where force is the ultimate sanction in the resolution of disputes, and where eventually recourse is had to self-help, the size and fighting potential of lineages is a vital consideration. There is no reason to suppose that development in the lineage system, as it grows and expands historically, should lead to the production of a balanced system of units in which,

at every level of segmentation, the genealogical position of a descent group corresponds to its numerical strength and fighting potential. Indeed, evidence from lineage societies shows that this is very often not the case, and the problem then arises of a discrepancy between the genealogical position of a group and its actual power. For two lineages descended at the same level from a common ancestor, and therefore genealogically equivalent, may be totally unequal in power. Where political status is defined primarily by descent within the genealogical system, this means that, either the genealogy represents an ideal pattern of political groupings which is not that of actuality, or that genealogies are manipulated and adjusted so that they in fact reflect the actual balance of power. This process of matching genealogical position to political status has been described elsewhere for the Tiv (L. Bohannan, 1952), for the Gusii (Mayer, 1949), and is generally stressed by Fortes (1953). Southall (1952) has shown on the other hand that the Luo of Kenya gloss over these discrepancies which occur between the genealogical positions of groups and their actual power, without necessarily seeking to adjust their genealogies. Here the failure of the genealogical structure to mirror exactly the distribution of power in society is regarded as the difference between ideal and practice. Again, amongst the northern pastoral Somali, who have a segmentary lineage political system but who do not rely upon lineage ties alone, a form of political contract allows lineages to balance their strengths through alliances which rarely alter their genealogical relationships and which sometimes cut across and even contradict them (which is described in my forthcoming *A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*).

V

But if this question is not treated as fully as it might be, the editors of *Tribes Without Rulers* raise many other significant points. They stress the significance of land—of those ties to locality which Maine summed up in the phrase ‘local contiguity’—as a component of fundamental importance in the six political systems with which they deal. This leads to consideration of the spatial distribution of lineage groups in relation to land and to demographic factors. They conclude here (pp. 9–10) that ‘lineages provide the cores of local groups and provide a permanent framework for ever-changing relations between them. Local units are thus bound together into a single system by the assumed genealogical relationships between the lineage founders, who are at the points of articulation of the lineage system.’ This stress on ties to locality which runs through most anthropological writing on tribal politics is not, however, a necessary condition of political solidarity for it is relatively unimportant in societies which have as nomadic an economy and as

shifting and ephemeral land relationships as those of the Northern pastoral Somali (Lewis, 1959).

Moreover, Gluckman in his analysis of the political constitution of the Lozi shows that even in so centralized a polity land need not be the basis of political unity (Gluckman, 1951).

Other topics which are discussed are the degree and character of segmentation, the length of genealogical span (greatest amongst the Tiv and Dinka who have the largest populations), the degree of development of specific political offices, the organization and incidence of self-help, the relation of ritual organization to the lineage system, and, finally, the problem of equilibrium in segmentary lineage societies.

VI

In relation to these particular questions the six lineage societies are grouped into three classes. The first class distinguished, referred to as Group I, includes the Tiv and Lugbara who are grouped with the Nuer. Here the locally based descent groups which are the political divisions are contained within a single pyramidal lineage system. There is little specialization of political offices and the few and rudimentary positions of authority which occur have primarily domestic and ritual influence.

The second group contains the Konkomba and Amba, who are bracketed with the Tallensi. Here the political units are small descent groups of shallow genealogical span, and are associated in over-lapping clusters by ritual links and 'quasi-kinship ties'. The largest political groups which occur have internally a regular lineage structure upon which their internal relations are based. Externally, however, these units are not linked by a single genealogy but through common attachments and duties which are not phrased in lineage terms. It is here that clanship as distinct from lineage affiliation enters as a principle of unity. Finally, a third type called 'aggregational' or 'associated' is distinguished. This includes the remaining two peoples—the Mandari and Dinka. The bracketing of these together seems the least happy of three classifications. It is true that in comparison with the other four societies discussed the Mandari and Dinka both have more developed and specialized chiefly offices which are strongest amongst the Mandari. But Dr. Buxton herself holds (p. 93) that the political system of the Mandari has closer affinities with that of the Shilluk or Anuak than with the Dinka.

The Mandari consist traditionally of a number of independent petty chiefdoms which in the past sometimes combined against others in small alliances but which were often divided by hostility. The basis of each chiefdom was a dominant land-owning clan which, with its divisions into unsegmented lineages each with a well-defined territory, provided a skeletal nucleus to which clients and

subsequent settlers were attached. Within a chiefdom, corporate relations depended upon the kind of relations, friendly or hostile, obtaining between and among the leaders of segments. Dr. Buxton emphasizes that Mandari politics are not based upon a segmentary lineage structure in the strict sense. For 'Mandari political relations were not based on political relativity, arising from the existence of powerful agnatic lineages which were also political segments, the constituent parts of which constantly changed in relation to varying political pressures. Lineage segments in Mandari did not form a wide network stretching beyond the territorial boundary; on the contrary, they were defined by territorial limits. They were always of the same order, that is, each individual segment, a lineage, was a unit with an unchanging value, and never part of a number of lineages built up in a hierarchy' (page 93). These statements recall the difficulty experienced by Barnes in discussing the segmentary character of the Ngoni state (Barnes, 1954) and suggest, as does the general tenor of Dr. Buxton's essay, that though Mandari were and are organized on a genealogical principle their political structure is not precisely that of a segmentary lineage type as characterized by the editors in their introduction. Leaving these considerations aside, however, it would seem that the Mandari could more appropriately be classed as morphologically of political structure C in our typology, and grouped with societies such as the Shona where there is some degree of hierarchy (see above, page 61). They certainly do not stand at the extreme end of the political spectrum with the Nuer and other societies without any formal governmental hierarchy.

Dinka political structure is clearly complex. The largest autonomous group which acts politically is the 'tribe', varying in population from a mere thousand individuals to twenty-five times that number. Within a tribe the largest political segments are 'subtribes', and in smaller tribes these may have no politically significant segments. Thus Dinka segmentary political relations concern the relations between subtribes, and smaller segments, and their unity as tribes in relation to other tribes. But these relations are not, as among the Nuer, directly co-ordinate with the segmentation of any single descent group. Dr. Lienhardt sums up the position as follows: 'It is clear that a Dinka tribe has a kind of lineage structure, since any of its segments is politically identified with one or more agnatic descent groups. It is equally clear that the relationships between all its segments—even between the largest, the subtribes—cannot invariably, or even usually, be explained by reference to the agnatic genealogy of a single descent group' (p. 126). For all subtribes do not stand at fixed and known distances from each other corresponding to the fixed and known distances between descent groups in a single agnatic genealogy.

Dr. Lienhardt adopts the term 'associated' lineage structure to characterize the Dinka system. For unlike the situation in a Mandari chiefdom, the genealogical pattern of a Dinka tribe is 'not

one of numerous small "client" or attached lineages whose total relationship can be expressed only in terms of their common relationship to a single dominant agnatic group' (p. 133). Within a Dinka tribe component political segments are united and divided by cross-cutting agnatic ties which, moreover, extend outside the tribe. It is, Dr. Lienhardt suggests, the complexity of the interrelations between their political and lineage structure which leads Dinka to speak of their political relations in a kinship idiom rather than only in terms of agnatic links to a common lineage.

VII

These few comments on the brave attempt of Dr. Middleton and Dr. Tait to classify the societies with which they deal illustrate the very real difficulties which are encountered as soon as anything but the simplest morphological comparisons are essayed. It seems that in any general classification of tribal systems of government it is first useful to adopt some simple sliding scale such as that suggested earlier in this review article where a central criterion such as the degree of centralization and formalization of governmental agencies is taken as a common basis for comparison. A secondary, but clearly related and unfortunately much more complex, study is then a comparative examination of the various governmental processes which different societies employ within any given category—tribal state, segmentary state, uncentralized society, etc. Such a simple typology facilitates the comparative analysis of the functions of the same institution or governmental principle in different types of polity and under different ecological and social conditions. And it may eventually be possible to use other dimensions of comparison, additional to the one proposed here which depends only on the degree of centralization and multiplicity of politico-administrative offices. This would allow systems of government to be classified and arranged morphologically according to several different criteria.

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NOTES

THE THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE

THIS conference, on the adaptations of indigenous African political systems to modern circumstances, must have been one of the most successful conferences the Institute has sponsored. As usual contributions were sought not only from academic research workers but also from officers of government and other organizations. All participants were asked to consider specifically if there was any correlation to be seen between the type of the indigenous political system concerned and its type of adaptation to modern circumstances primarily in the political sphere. On this theme a consistent finding of the Conference was that a marked difference *is* to be observed between relatively egalitarian and relatively inegalitarian polities, in that modern governmental practices, particularly in the field of bureaucracy, appear to be adopted more rapidly in the former than the latter. This offers a stimulating subject for further research since this conclusion differs from that Dr. Southall suggests in his book *Alur Society*, written on the basis of his fieldwork in an East African state, namely that the converse is true.

The papers and discussions have been edited with an introduction by R. J. Apthorpe, and published under the title *From Tribal Rule to Modern Government*, pp. xix and 216. Roneo'd, between stiff covers, the price is 10s. Copies may be obtained while stocks last from the Librarian of the Institute. The full list of contents is:

Foreword: H. A. Fosbrooke.

Introduction: R. J. Apthorpe.

Policies:

Northern Rhodesia: Government Policy in the Utilization of Indigenous Political Systems, by M. G. Billing.

Tanganyika: The Application of Indirect Rule to Chiefless Societies, by H. A. Fosbrooke.

A note on the Use of Local Courts in the Northern Province of Tanganyika, with special reference to the Masai, by R. B. Sutcliffe.

Chiefs and Councils in Southern Rhodesia, by R. Howman.

Indirect Rule as a Policy of Adaptation, by R. Brown.

Case Studies:

Ruanda-Urundi: The Introduction of an Electoral System for Councils in a Caste Society, by J. J. Maquet.

Northern Rhodesia: Clanship, Chieftainship and Nsenga Political Adaptation, by R. J. Apthorpe.

- Northern Rhodesia: Soli Chieftainships and Political Adaptation, by W. J. Argyle.
- Northern Rhodesia: Luvale Political Organization and the Luvale Lineage, by C. M. N. White.
- Nigeria: Fifty Years of Political Development among the Ibo, by A. H. St. John Wood.
- Nyasaland: The Official Headman and Yao Lineage Structure in Peri-Urban Blantyre-Limbe, by D. G. Bettison.
- Two kinds of Headmanship in a Rural Area in the Southern Province of Nyasaland, by R. Wishlade.
- Somalia, United Nations Trusteeship Territory: Pastoral and Party Politics, by I. M. Lewis.
- Tanganyika: A note of Successes and Failures in Luguru Adaptation, by H. A. Fosbrooke.

Concluding sessions:

Introductions to Discussions by J. J. Maquet, C. M. N. White and R. J. Apthorpe, on:

Some Problems of the Classification of Tribal Structures, and Notes on a Typology of the African Polities discussed in the Conference for a Study of Political Change, Indirect Rule, Local Government and Politics, The Introduction of Western Bureaucracy into African Polities, The Interpretation of New Institutions, Changing Chieftainship and Political Transition.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORKERS' SEMINAR

The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

From 2-11 June, Professor J. Clyde Mitchell organized a seminar of social anthropological fieldworkers at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. From the programme which follows it will be seen that Institute staff and affiliates were well represented. Mr. R. Wishlade (Fellow of the International Institute) read a paper on 'Modern Sectarian Movements in Nyasaland'; Dr. P. and Mrs. J. Roumeguere (two Rhodes-Livingstone Institute affiliates) spoke on their studies in the Kalanga-Karanga complex in Southern Rhodesia; Mr. R. Rotberg (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute affiliate) surveyed 'The Growth of Missionary Activities in Northern Rhodesia'; Dr. I. M. Lewis (Lecturer in African Studies, the University College) discussed 'A Classification of African Political Systems'; Mr. G. K. Garbett (research student, the University College) analysed 'Structural Changes in some Zezuru Villages in Southern Rhodesia: 1948-1958'; Mr. W. J. Argyle (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Research Officer) described 'Clan and Lineage Concepts amongst the Soli'. Dr. R. J. Apthorpe (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Research Secretary) proposed a general theory with reference to 'Nsenga Clan Joking Relationships'. The Seminar was most successful, a good deal of time being allowed for discussion and reading

in the various library centres in Salisbury, besides an excursion to an archaeological site at Rusape in Southern Rhodesia where excavations are revealing some interrelations between the Zimbabwe and the Inyanga constructions. The papers read at the Seminar will be published individually in various journals, and not collectively such as is the practice of this Institute.

RHODES-LIVINGSTONE COMMUNICATIONS

Associate members are reminded that Communications are issued only to those who specifically request them. Libraries and institutional members have simply to place a standing order to receive all Communications. It is hoped that in the interest of economy private members will be selective and ask for only those Communications directly of interest to them. To facilitate this, brief resumés of the Communications published since the last issue of the Journal are appended.

No. 16. *Numerical data on African dwellers in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia*, by D. G. Bettison.

The main purpose of this study is to provide reliable information about family composition, the degree of urbanization and the ability to pay rent, of African urban dwellers in Lusaka. It is based on fieldwork on the basis of a 10 per cent random sample carried out mainly between July, 1957, and August, 1958, but two small 'locations' were covered between August, 1958, and February, 1959.

The Communication provides only the statistical and tabular data obtained from the fieldwork. It attempts to give not only the conditions existing at the time of the survey, but also indications of probable trends over the next few years, derived from the comparison with the earlier 1954 survey by Professor Mitchell which he carried out when at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

Among the many conclusions drawn from the statistical data are those concerning the increase in total population, the increase in the number of women and children and the number of primary families. Also described is the tendency for an increase in the size of primary families and the greater stabilization probable in the future. An index of stabilization on the basis of Professor Mitchell's earlier studies of Luanshya and Ndola is also calculated.

No. 17. *Further Economic and Social Studies, Blantyre-Limbe, Nyasaland*, by D. G. Bettison, H. D. Ng'wane, and A. A. Nyirenda.

This Communication contains three short papers. The first, by Mr. H. D. Ng'wane, examines the methods of contracting marriages amongst the peri-urban African population in Blantyre-Limbe. He compares the present practices with traditional Yao marriage and

discusses the causes of the changes which have taken place. The decreased functions of the sureties to the marriage (who played a very important part in traditional Yao marriage), and the abandoning of the rituals which were deemed necessary for the completion of the marriage in Yao tribal society, are amongst these.

In the second paper, Mr. A. A. Nyirenda examines the distribution of the markets in Blantyre-Limbe area, the commodities available in them, and the factors which determine price fixing. The paper is largely concerned with the municipal markets, but observations were made in the peri-urban markets for comparison. The sources and conditions of demand for various basic food items are also discussed, the main seasonal changes being mentioned. The study shows that the greatest amount of commodities sold in the markets is obtained from areas other than the peri-urban and rural areas close to Blantyre-Limbe. Prices are fixed 'largely by trial and error', but seasonal and monthly fluctuations occur and the sex and age of both buyers and sellers also influence price.

In the third paper, Dr. D. G. Bettison examines the price changes and their causes in greater detail. The conclusions are tentative due to the limitations of the material available, as it was collected by individuals engaged primarily in another research scheme.

No. 7. *A Select Social Science Bibliography of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. A revised edition.* Communication No. 7 (Pp. circa 80; price 5s.)

A select bibliography mainly compiled by R. M. S. Ng'ombe, Assistant Librarian of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, is about to be reissued but in a revised edition. It comprises reference to all books and major articles of ethnographic, sociological, political or economic interest on Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, up to mid 1959. Entries are classified by area or, where appropriate, by area and tribe. As a full survey of the languages of the three territories from the point of view of grammar, texts, etc., has already been published as No. 14 in this series, languages are not covered in this revised No. 7. Neither are pre-history and archaeology. Every attempt has been made by the Librarian and the Assistant Librarian to tap all sources, but they would be grateful to hear of any they have overlooked.

Communications and Conference Proceedings are now obtainable direct from the Manchester University Press, 316-324, Oxford Road, Manchester 13, as well as from the Institute at Lusaka.

STAFF CHANGES

Since the notes on staff changes were published in Journal 23 there have been numerous staff movements.

Dr. Bettison, after 2½ strenuous years in Central Africa, moved on to a university post, having accepted a Senior Lectureship at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

Miss Ellis, the Local Research Officer who was in charge of the Nyasaland team under Dr. Bettison, resigned as from the end of June, 1959, on her engagement to be married.

With the departure of Messrs. Matthews and Clack, the Industrial Research commitments of the Institute were confined to the enquiry into Absenteeism and Labour Turnover undertaken at the request of the Federal Government in conformity with a continent wide plan worked out by the Inter-African Labour Institute, a body subsidiary to the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara. Mr. Alan Burnett came to the Institute from a career in personnel work on the Copperbelt and in Salisbury and is in charge of a team of three Research Assistants all with Advanced Level School Certificate qualifications.

Mr. McEwan, an Edinburgh graduate, came out to undertake the enquiry into family instability of the European population on the Copperbelt, but, as the time was not opportune to commence such work, moved to Southern Rhodesia to take up the alternative item of European sociology on the Institute's programme, namely a study of the integration of European immigrants into Southern Rhodesian society.

Mr. Richardson, the Human Geographer whose forthcoming arrival was announced in Journal No. 23, was prevented at the last moment by ill health from taking up his post. Mr. George Kay, who has just completed two years' post-graduate work at Liverpool University, is now coming to undertake this project.

AFFILIATES

A number of Affiliated members have joined the Institute for varying periods.

Dr. and Mme Roumeguere of the Sorbonne, Paris, are undertaking an extensive study of the Kalanga group of Southern Rhodesia: their work should throw light on the people who built and inhabited Zimbabwe. Dr. Roumeguere, a psychologist, is also interesting himself in the psychotherapeutic effects of African ritual.

R. Rotberg, lately of Princeton, and presently a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, is in Northern Rhodesia for a year on field work connected with his study of the part of the Missions in the development of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924.

Mrs. H. Carter, lately of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and now the wife of an Education Officer, is studying the Tonga language under a C.S.S.R.C. Grant.

P. Stutley, a District Commissioner of Basutoland, is preparing a thesis for submission to Reading University on Systems of Produce Marketing in Africa. He spent a month at the Institute studying the local systems and collecting comparative material from the Library.

Dr. Monica Cole, of the University of North Staffordshire, arrived in June, 1959, for four months to undertake a study of the

savannah environment of Northern Rhodesia. She has obtained assistance from the Mining Companies, and will work in co-operation with the Institute and the Northern Rhodesian Department of Agriculture.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

The number of associate members has been steadily rising and it has been felt desirable to offer something more than the publications and the library facilities to which the present fee of 30s. p.a. entitles them. As there are 50 associates in Lusaka, evening talks and seminars have been arranged, at times in conjunction with the Lusaka centre of the Northern Rhodesia Society, which is based on the Institute, and with the Lusaka branch of the Rhodesia University Association.

Anyone interested in this activity, or in the general work of the Institute should contact the Director at Box 900, Lusaka.

REVIEWS

European Politics in Southern Rhodesia. By COLIN LEYS. Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1959). Pp. xii + 323. 42s.

CHAPTERS dealing with the European population and the historical bases of European politics provide an *ad hoc* context for describing constitutions, institutions, interests and pressure groups, political parties, representation, elections, and political ideology of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. Appendices provide brief descriptions of politics in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and an account of the Southern Rhodesia General Election of 1958.

Some of the more important facts of political importance in Southern Rhodesian European society, Leys says, are '... the dominance of the immigrant, the importance (but not the dominance) of the artisan, the high-consumption economy, political homogeneity, and the role of the *élite* ...'. Statistical data are carefully provided to portray the salience of these factors, and they complement information obtained through archival work and personal interviews.

Following an initial period of partial disillusionment with Southern Rhodesia's envisioned mineral wealth, the depression of the 1930's generated demands among the Europeans to erect elaborate legal supports for protecting their lands, jobs, and social and political prerogatives. Political and economic predominance was legally defended through consolidating laws with respect to land ownership, employment, education, residence, and social contact. Consequently, the differential wealth of Europeans and Africans, for example, is based chiefly upon 'the inequality of the laws of property'.

Throughout Southern Rhodesian history, European politics have been characterized by a weak or nominal opposition. The 'real' opposition, Leys argues, was and is the African population. Since responsible government was obtained, a stable one-party system has prevailed. Interest and pressure groups were sufficiently identified with the government so that only short-run conflicts occurred, such as the rise of the Labour Party. With the growth of the European population, however, the government has been able to play off various major interest groups against one another. An increasing consciousness among the Europeans of African interests has further strengthened the powers of the government *vis-à-vis* segmental interest groups.

Because of their importance for the future of the country, and the Federation as well, the recent changes in electoral qualifications are described and analysed. Practical considerations, even in the de-

iberations of the Tredgold Commission, have overridden theoretical or abstract principles, Leys believes. The solution to the major problems of the country are not possible within the present political system, for a solution would automatically change the system. However, 'the internally democratic nature of the system militates against such a change. Power tends to gravitate towards those [i.e. the Europeans] who are least ready for change, having most to lose.'

The most stimulating chapter embraces Leys' impressions of the political ideology generally characterizing Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. Although acknowledging the universal presence of rationalizing or mythological systems, the author impugns questionable motives to the Europeans. He examines incisively the logical contradictions and inconsistencies within the ideology, between it and political activities, and in terms of its historical affinities with a non-racial ideology of politics.

This summary of a lengthy description of European politics in Southern Rhodesia is much too brief. Leys does not eschew value judgments, yet he generally seems to be successful in constraining himself judiciously. As a descriptive monograph it is valuable, although it does not describe all facets of European politics in Southern Rhodesia. Its merits include adherence to a central theme and an enjoyable prose style.

There seem to be few errors of fact. The table on page 82 should be entitled 'Occupational . . .' rather than 'Social Classes . . .' Statements that Europeans receive 'free' education and maternity services leave unexplained their methods of financial support. Impressions about the relationship between 'racial' attitudes and national ethnic origin, country of birth, occupation, and length of residence will be checked by research currently in progress in Southern Rhodesia. The same appertains to his view that most immigrants start at the bottom of the economic ladder. Further, it is questionable whether 'the bulk of the [African] labour force moves continuously back and forth between [urban] locations and the country . . .'

Other difficulties arise. Strong positive ties with South Africa are examined, whereas affiliations with Great Britain are described predominantly in negative terms. The 'electorate' and the 'public' are described as different categories of people, yet no attempt is made to examine the extent to which Africans are a part of a 'public' in the political sense.

This raises a more important problem. No definitions are provided for such key words as politics, structure, government, or system. This failure injures the utility of the study at several points, for the political system is not clearly differentiated as a specific subsystem in the total society. Sizable differences in *per capita* income between Europeans and Africans are described, and implicitly censured. As with many previous descriptions, no account is taken of the monetary value of subsidies or 'free' provision to some

Europeans of houses, rents, transportation, education and health. Here is a crucial issue, both for political theory and practical policy, which Leys recognizes: 'In the last analysis, the meaning of "development" for African population is what is at stake in contemporary Rhodesian politics. The question is whether Africans are as rich as they should be . . .' Until Leys or someone devises a scheme for converting these privileges and services into income figures (assuming the continuance of the current wage-employment-residential systems), discussion and judgments about differential wages and amenities will remain outside the realm of dispassionate examination.

The major criticisms of this fine book relate to two items. First, it does not explore with sufficient depth. Discussions of the following topics would have been highly pertinent: What is the political role of the church, and the significance of church membership, as against other group affiliations, in determining political activity, especially ideology? How are leaders recruited, and how is leadership exercised, as affected by family and kinship ties, old Rhodesian genealogies, wealth, eloquence, education, and generosity? Since a prime characteristic phenomenon of politics is the legitimization of force, why does this book lack discussion of the army and the police? The government surely has had to build up loyalty through propaganda and education, yet by what means and with what success has this been accomplished? The civil service likewise is not thoroughly examined. This seems to be a major shortcoming, for if Africans have never been allowed or wanted to become a 'real opposition', then we need to know what processes were employed at all levels of government to maintain European dominance. Were the relevant variables the officials of the Native Affairs Department, school syllabi, or a 'dependency complex' such as Mannoni describes in Malgache? Other important omissions are the conflicts between the municipalities and the Southern Rhodesian government, and between the latter and the Federal government. Just how centralized is the Southern Rhodesian government in relation to the municipalities, and what consequences does this have for the maintenance of the contemporary political systems in the future?

These comments, which are not intended to derogate Leys' work, point to the second major shortcoming. There is no sense of theory here: no comparisons, except spuriously, with other countries and other times. There exists a lack of categories by which further empirical studies can be made. The book tends to be a formalistic, non-dynamic, parochial, and non-comparable political ethnography. Leys has no discussion, for example, of what surely is one of the most relevant functions of politics, the deliberative process and decision-making. The author characterizes Southern Rhodesia's 'social, economic, and political framework inherited from the years before the Second World War' as 'rigid'. This term would seem to characterize his conceptual approach for studying the European 'frame-

work' of politics in Southern Rhodesia as well. The book is likely to become quickly dated, yet in posing further problems for research it will serve a useful function.

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Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. By JAMES S. COLEMAN, University of California (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958). Pp. xiv + 510. \$7.50.

PROFESSOR COLEMAN claims that his book is no more than an introduction to selected aspects of the political history of modern Nigeria. This is very modest, as he might well have called his book a short outline of the history of Nigeria. In fact, the author is an investigator and an historian of the highest order and I found this factual and unemotional account most refreshing in a world bedevilled by the vociferous utterings of those with strong opinions and little knowledge.

Unfortunately, the author has carried modesty too far and has confined himself too much to history to the detriment of an examination of the deeper springs of nationalism. Does there grow, for instance, in these emerging heterogeneous nations, that ignoble and outmoded sentiment expressed with such bravado by Walter Scott

'Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land?'

There is some evidence to show that it does, and that among the instincts shared by the races of the world is the urge for men to identify themselves with a community and to feel pride or resentment at achievements by or slights on both the community and its individuals. Does the Nigerian's breast swell with pride when Hogan Bassey wins the Empire light-weight title? It certainly swelled with indignation when the film of the Queen's tour showed the romantic, barbaric and tribal side of Nigerian life, rather than its growing modernity.

Perhaps, unconsciously, the most illuminating portion of the book on this aspect of nationalism is Professor Coleman's evaluation of the American share in forwarding the nationalist cause in Nigeria. My own view is that British opinion underwent a change during and after the second world war. Formerly, we felt that the British Peace and the Bible justified our conquest of colonial territories. Possibly it did, but now we can no longer justify to ourselves domination of emergent nations, with which is linked in our minds the exploitative capitalism that has given way in our own country to a welfare state based on controlled free enterprise and democracy. Our government

was faced with the choice between repression of nationalism by force and rapid constitutional reform. In the normal atmosphere of post-war Britain, only the latter was possible. Professor Coleman, however, gives America the credit for considerable influence in more liberal British policies and in encouraging Nigerian nationalism. Alas that he should quote, as the American trained leaders in the latter enterprise, Mbonu Ojike, Nwafor Orizu and Ozuomba Mbadiwe. The last two were involved in an American scholarship scheme over which Nwafor Orizu went to prison because he embezzled some of the funds. Mbonu Ojike was the arch-intriguer of the Eastern Region and the subject of some startling revelations in an enquiry into corruption shortly before his death. Mbadiwe is still living. He has recently formed his own party, splintering off from Dr. Azikiwe's party.

With regard to the question of corruption in public and commercial life in Nigeria I find it extraordinary that the author, who could give in his first chapter such a striking and accurate summary of the characteristics of the people of the Eastern Region, has almost completely neglected this point. To my mind, one of the most important developments in national movements is the tendency for careerists and adventurers to work on the emotions of the people to gain leadership, with its accompanying power and affluence. Hitler said in *Mein Kampf* that mass movements did not arise spontaneously from grievances, but were started by leaders using these grievances to organize the people into a movement. A mass of people whose emotions have been aroused is unfortunately not given to the careful analysis of the character and motives of its leaders. A nationalist movement can produce a Washington or a Garibaldi, but it may produce a Hitler or a Mussolini. The 1953 crisis in the Eastern Region was a battle between the moderate and reputable ministry of Professor Eyo Ita and the supporters of Ojike, who were disappointed not only by the mild political attitude of that ministry, but by its failure to provide jobs, and other perquisites, for the boys. Eyo Ita was a man with some ideals; Ojike had that odd, but not uncommon, mixture of motives of fanatical hatred for the Colonial government and a desire for power, and when his supporters got in with Azikiwe as Prime Minister, he began intriguing to depose Azikiwe and step into his shoes.

Azikiwe is on the whole in the better class of leader. He has a number of failings, and his dealings over the 1956 bank crisis fell short of 'the expectations of honest, reasonable people', according to the Foster-Sutton Commission of Inquiry, but I believe his main motive was the non-violent achievement of self-government and the development of his people. Ambition and vanity unfortunately made him a prey to the tough, unscrupulous clique led by Ojike, a demagogue in the American style who had considerable emotional appeal to the masses. In a society whose basic discipline was dis-

integrating under the Western impact, corruption in public life was a major factor and the indigenous institutions through which the Colonial government ruled were themselves corrupt. There was therefore a tendency among the people to turn towards nationalism, not only through antagonism to the Colonial power, but in reaction against their own Nigerian authorities and courts. At the same time, except in the more stable feudal North, there was a scramble by the members of the corrupt native authorities (including some new local government bodies) and the official native institutions to climb on to the N.C.N.C. band-wagon. This was partly because, in the last few years, self-government was obviously on the way and N.C.N.C. support was the means to power in the future, and partly because the N.C.N.C. hold of the masses, largely through Azikiwe's name, made its support necessary to obtain power in the present in the new elected institutions.

It is odd that in the intrigues and corruption surrounding the emerging nationalist parties, at any rate in the Eastern Region, people did not turn back to the British District Officer who, touring his division, was always a popular and welcome figure, travelling with his family unarmed and at ease, with no police or messengers to guard him. Yet the people were willing to let this fatherly figure go, rather than abandon their dream of self-government, even if corrupt. This, I think, illustrates more than anything, that nationalism is not created by grievances but exists of itself, regardless of the worth of the foreign rulers.

It is interesting to note also that the martial Hausa and Fulani did not have the same ardent desire to rid themselves of foreign rule as the uncertain, emotionally insecure Southerners. There was a similar phenomenon in India, where the martial Northern tribes, many of them intensely proud, showed a greater disposition to like their rulers than the less martial and less admirable (from a western point of view) masses of the Ganges valley.

I started this review by praise, but then turned to severe criticism. In spite of this, I consider the book a valuable and admirable work, because of its thorough investigation and excellent marshalling and presentation of the facts of the history of Nigeria. It is a little marred by the author's American nationalism. I have a feeling that it gives Americans a warm, cosy glow to see themselves as world moral leaders, particularly, because of their history, in colonial matters. A more serious fault is a neglect of the deeper springs of nationalism, the urge for groups to preserve their identity and to forward their 'vital interests' or 'just aspirations' (words of ill omen!) in competition with other groups. This urge is increased, of course, by economic grievances, and rendered aggressive by frustration, but I think there are reasons to believe that it only becomes desperate under an imposed feeling of inferiority. The Belgian committee enquiring into the Leopoldville disturbances earlier this year gave as one of the major causes 'the scorn of the

white settlers for the Africans'. I would dearly wish to hear the thoughts of a man of Professor Coleman's calibre on these aspects of nationalism.

I may, of course, be influenced by my desire, as an administrator, to have immediate answers to the urgent problems confronting European governments in Africa, whereas our author wants only accurate knowledge and, a true scientist, eschews idle theorizing. After all, his book is only intended to be a background to nationalism, and apart from some wrong emphases, a very good background it is. Unbalanced particularly is his failure to highlight the fact that the unpopularity of the Richards constitution was that it rested mainly on the Native Authorities, of whose corruption and apathy in the South, where the main opposition came from, every one was tired. He also dismisses Sir John Macpherson as 'tactful and conciliatory'. He depicts him as giving way to nationalist pressure partly because of the new psychological atmosphere in Britain and Nigeria and partly because of fear of disturbances. In fact, early self-government was a foregone conclusion and Sir John's problem was to juggle his way through tribal and political differences to achieve some sort of unity. Only a man of his obvious sincerity and considerable determination could have laid the foundations of modern Nigeria in so short a time.

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The Agricultural Register (New Series)—Changes in the Economic Pattern 1956-7. Agricultural Economics Research Institute, University of Oxford. Pp. 234. 21s.

BEFORE 1939 the Agricultural Economics Research Institute of the University of Oxford published the *Agricultural Register*, which ceased to appear owing to the war. Its purpose was to set out as concisely and as clearly as possible the indisputable facts about the economics of British agriculture in most of its varied aspects for the use of all those concerned in the field of action or of education. The present volume is the first of a new series issued by the Institute under its Director, Colin Clark, designed to give a concise and impartial account of the present position of British agriculture and to record the events of the year 1956-7 in the field of policy, marketing, guaranteed prices, subsidies, finance, international trade, labour, land, etc., in the United Kingdom.

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These facts are presented throughout in the form of a connected narrative which is objective, interesting and readable. It is most opportune at the present time to have material of this description made available in so digestible a form. Here in Central Africa the conditions differ materially from those in the United Kingdom, but we are concerned with basically the same problems: to promote the long-term competitiveness of the farming industry, to encourage sound economic trends and changes, and to help small farmers to become economically stronger. This is a book which can be recommended to all who are interested in the complex problems of agricultural policy in the fields of both production and marketing in Africa today.

C. LYNN.

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
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